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Angolan diamond production from alluvial sources is 
apparently set into a pattern of long-term decline. The 
industry needs to develop hard-rock diamond mines if it is 
to regain its former status as a significant diamond produc­
er. The feasibility of such development and the means by 
which it may be achieved is the subject of this thesis.
Current Angolan policy- towards foreign investment is 
reviewed. It is concluded that while recent statements of 
policy indicate an attractive environment for foreign in­
vestment, significant practical barriers remain, namely, a 
fixed and overvalued exchange rate and lack of specific 
fiscal legislation covering mining agreements.
A capital and operating cost model for a hard-rock 
diamond mine is developed based on the USBM Cost Estimating 
System. This model is found to perform satisfactorily when 
tested against an Australian deposit for which costs have 
been published. The model is then used to estimate cost for 
twro Angolan prospects: a small kimberlite deposit requiring
moderate capital investment and a large-scale major invest­
ment .
Financial simulation of the small-scale development 
indicates it is not viable even when financed by cheap 
development funds. Contributory reasons are low value ore,
i i i
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short mine life, and lack of economies of scale. Financial 
modeling of the large-scale option shows it to be uneconomic 
under the existing fiscal legislation in Angola, Tanzania, 
and Botswana owing to the use of fixed rate taxation. The 
deposit is marginally economic under Ghanaian taxation which 
employs variable-rate tax instruments. Such a system of 
taxation is clearly required in Angola.
The marginal nature of the Angolan kimberlite prospects 
makes debt leveraged funding of projects attractive. Lever­
age gives large companies (with low risk premia on debt) an 
advantage over junior mining companies and suggests that De 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION
Diamonds are a commodity with which Africa is dispro­
p o r t i o n a t e l y  well endowed compared with the rest of the 
world. Of the forty-one countries on the African continent, 
thirteen have exploited diamond deposits this century. The 
degree to which this endowment has contributed to devel­
opment has varied from country to.country. At one extreme, 
Botswana (with an average annual real GDP growth of 12.9% 
since 1971) owes its good fortune to the foreign exchange 
earnings derived from three diamond mines. At the other 
extreme, Tanzania appears to have derived little benefit 
from the exploitation of the world’s largest diamond pipe. 
The object of this thesis is to assess the economic poten­
tial of hard-rock diamond deposits in Angola. With five 
known but undeveloped diamondiferous kimberlites, Angola is 
often cited in the mining press as having the potential of 
another Botswana, This study will attempt to determine 
whether that reputation has any substance.
For five hundred years Angola was a Portuguese colony 
and was one of the last countries in Africa to achieve inde­
pendence when the Portuguese abruptly withdrew in 197 5 as
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the result of a military coup in Portugal, This precipitous 
departure left a power vacuum which the proxies of the 
superpowers hastened to fill. The result of this has been 
that since 1975 the country has remained locked in a civil 
war that has brought economic development to a standstill. 
The best, that can be said is that the level of infrastruc­
ture has remained frozen at 1975 levels (good by African 
standards). Angola has a healthy oil industry (geographical­
ly separated from areas of conflict) that has grown from a 
production of 159,000 barrels per day in 1975 to 450,000 in 
1989. But the economy as a whole has stagnated in the post- 
colonial period, and living standards of individuals have 
declined sharply. Two factors are responsible. First, the 
bulk of the oil revenues have been consumed by the military 
budget. Second, the conflict has paralyzed the internal 
transport system, crippling’ the agricultural and mining 
sectors in the process. Both factors have largely offset the 
gains achieved in the oil industry.
Until the end of the 1980s the Angolan conflict ap­
peared to be locked into an equilibrium of violence. Oil 
revenues and Soviet bloc military help ensured the govern­
ment’s ability to carry on fighting while South African and 
American support of guerrilla movements opposed to the 
government guaranteed the continuation of debilitating
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guerrilla war. This equilibrium now seems set to change. The 
independence of Namibia and South African preoccupation with 
domestic political matters has weakened the position of the 
guerrillas. Similarly, the withdrawal of Cuban troops and 
turmoil in the Soviet Union has deprived the Angolan govern­
ment of much of its military support. Against this back­
ground it seems a reasonable bet that some form of negotiat­
ed settlement will be achieved in the medium term and that 
economic development will once again become feasible in 
Angola. Given this, oil and diamonds are certain to loom 
large in the list of candidates for engines of economic 
growth.
This study will examine the future economic prospects 
of the Angolan diamond industry and will focus in particular 
on the viability of known deposits, on the organizational 
variants by which they could be exploited, and on the impact 
of various forms of fiscal legislation on individual pros­
pects. The viability of known prospects will be assessed by 
building a capital and operating cost model of a hard-rock 
diamond mine based on the USBM Cost Estimation System (TJSBM 
1987) in which the Argyle Mine in Australia will serve both 
as a technical model and as a check on the accuracy of the 
cost model. This model will then be adapted to reflect the 
differing characteristics of the Angolan prospects that
T-3945 4
arise from geological differences and from different costs 
of the factors of production between countries.
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Chapter 2
ECONOMIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF 
ANGOLAN DIAMOND RESOURCES
There are two aspects to the economic potential of dia­
monds in Angola. One is the short-term to medium-term eco­
nomic potential of known resources and the other is the 
long-term mineral potential of the remainder of the country. 
These two economic objectives are also characterized by 
distinctly different levels of risk due to geographic fac­
tors in addition to normal (knowledge related) geological 
r i sk ,
A line drawn across Angola from northeast to southwest 
(fig. 2.1) serves to divide the country into two categories 
as far as diamondiferous character and levels of infrastruc­
ture are concerned. The northwest sector has been thoroughly 
prospected, has demonstrable undeveloped diamond potential, 
and probably contains few surprises in the way of additional 
discoveries. The northwest is also well endowed with the 
necessary infrastructure.
The southeast sector of Angola has favorable geology, 
is essentially unprospected, and has a minimal level of 
infrastructure. It has considerable potential for major 
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risk is high given the level of geologic knowledge and the 
likely cost of development.
The diamond prospects that are the most likely targets 
for short to medium-term development (and which are the 
focus of this study) are located in the northwest sector.
The same prospects are also likely to influence the final 
form of Angolan fiscal legislation which is currently under 
review. The danger exists that "bonanza psychology”, encour­
aged by real or perceived notions of the known prospects, 
may lead to an onerous fiscal regime which discourages high 
risk exploration in the southeast. Angola’s long-term poten­
tial may thus be sacrificed on the alter of medium-term 
expediency. The bulk of this study is concerned with placing 
a value on knoxvTn resources and designing an appropriate 
fiscal policy, the likely impact of the policy on explora­
tion activity will be returned to in the last chapter.
2.1 Economic Geology
Angola’s known diamond resources occur in the northeast 
part of the country (fig. 2.2) where alluvial deposits have 
been commercially exploited along five northflowing rivers 
since 1917 (Helmore 1984).
T-3945 8
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Four of these rivers (the Chicapa, Luachimo, Chiumbe, and 
Luembe) are located in the extreme northeast of the country 
while the fifth (the Cuango) is some 250 kilometers further 
to the west. Within this area there are three distinct types 
of diamond deposits, each of which has differing economics. 
To appreciate this it may be helpful to briefly describe the 
geological character of the area.
Some 130 million years ago Angola was subjected to a 
phase of rift faulting related to the formation of the 
Atlantic Ocean. A extensive series of northeast trending 
fractures developed across the country along which a host of 
volcanic centers were intruded. Amongst these intrusives are 
kimberlites (probably several hundred) of which about 1% 
contain, at. least, subeconomic quantities of diamonds. The 
river systems of the time were also controlled by the same 
system of northeast trending fault, troughs that had influ­
enced kimberlite emplacement. The net result was the erosion 
of the upper parts of the kimberlite pipes and dispersion of 
their diamond content along the river systems. These fossil 
alluvial deposits are now- known as the Calonda Formation. In 
the diamond areas the Calonda has been subsequently covered 
by about a hundred meters of younger sandy deposits.
Modern rivers that flow north have cut wide, flat- 
bottomed but steep sided valleys down through this geologi-
T - 3 9 4 5 10
cal layer cake. In the process the rivers have picked up 
diamonds where they intersect the old lines of kimberlite 
emplacement and the courses of the old Calonda rivers. This 
geological history has bequeathed three classes of diamond 
deposits to the region, all of which have contributed to 
past production to a greater or lesser extent.
Modern alluvial deposits related to the present river 
system have been the predominant historical source of dia­
monds owing to great areal extent, ease of access to mining 
equipment and low capital investment required.
Fossil alluvial deposits related to the Cretaceous 
river system have been worked by hydraulic mining in some 
areas where they outcrop in the valley sides as they can be 
treated in the same plants as the alluvial gravels. The 
limiting factor governing their exploitation is the overbur­
den that has to be removed. The steep valley sides and thin 
ore horizons mean that excessive stripping ratios rapidly 
become the limiting factor as mining cuts back into the 
valley side.
To a limited extent the diamondiferous kimberlites that 
have been exposed by erosion have also been mined in rela­
tively recent times. This mining, however, has been limited 
to the superficially weathered portions of the pipes that 
can be treated in the alluvial treatment plants.
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Exploitation of the alluvial deposits has continued 
without interruption since the 1920s. Originally, mining was 
carried out in up to 45 small and geographically dispersed 
mines. In the late 1960s, large-scale, heavy-media plants 
were built in response to declining grades with the objec­
tive of tapping economies of scale. These plants have stead­
ily depleted the alluvial deposits which are now nearing 
exhaustion. The state enterprise, Endiama, calculates that 
five years of alluvial reserves remain (Diamond Interna­
tional 1990). The remaining alluvial reserves are of steadi­
ly declining quality both in terms of grade and ease of 
access to mining equipment. Even under normal security 
conditions and with equipment operating at full capacity, a 
steadily declining diamond production is probably inevitable 
if alluvials continue to constitute the sole ore reserve.
The excessive overburden stripping requirements needed 
to access the diamond resources contained in the Calonda 
Formation effectively disqualify the Calonda as an signif­
icant source of future reserves. One is forced to the con­
clusion that the future depends on the kimberlit.es.
The decline in Angolan diamond production can be seen 
in table 2.1. Production has dropped steadily since 197 1 
apart from a brief renaissance in the early 1980s when mines 
were reequipped. The apparent recovery in the last three
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years is misleading and (if true) is the result of the 
exploitation of short-life bonanza deposits in the Caungo 
Division .
Table 2.1 Angolan Diamond Producti on, 1970 to 1989
Year Production 
( ’ 000 carats)
Year Product i on 
(’000 carats)
1970 2 , 396 1980 1 , 480
1971 2,413 1981 1 , 400
1972 2,155 1982 1 ,225
19 73 2 ,125 1983 1 ,034
1974 1 ,960 1984 902
1975 991 1985 704
1976 340 1986 250
1977 353 1987 190 (870)*
1978 700 1988 1,000 (1,000)
1979 750 1989 < 1 , 200)
* alternative figures from Diamond International, 
April 1990 
Source: USBM Mineral Yearbooks 19 72-88
Some three hundred kimberlit.es have been discovered to 
date in Angola, most of which are barren (Diamond Interna­
tional 1990). Those which can be classed as possible diamond 
resources are restricted to the areas of historical diamond 
production. There are five serious candidates for exploita­
tion, Catoca, C'amatchia, Camaf uca-Camazamba, Camutue, and 
Caixepa (fig. 2.2). Their principal characteristics are set
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out in table 2.2. All of these pipes are diamondiferous but 
none are obvious bonanzas of the order of Argyle (Australia) 
or Jwaneng (Botswana). Each pipe is different in terms of 
grade, size, diamond quality, and ease of development.
Catoca and Camafuca-Camazamba are very large, modest grade 
deposits of mainly industrial stones. Of the two Catoca at 
0.6 carats a ton is the highest grade and probably the 
better candidate for early development. The other three 
pipes are of modest size and low grade, but contain better 
quality stones. Of this group Camutue is probably best 
placed for development by virtue of its proximity to estab­
lished infrastructure.
Table 2,2 Diamondiferous Angolan Kimberlite Pipes
Kimberlite Surface Area Grade Stone Value
(hectares) (carats/ton) (1977 US$/carat>
Catoca 66.0 0.6 15
Camaf uca-
Camazamba 70.0 0.19 3 5
Camatchia. <10.0 0.19 35
Camutue 9.0 0.12 130
Caixepa. 2.3 0.10 150
Source: Lyons, L. 1983. World Mining. September. 50-56;
Author’s records
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For the purposes of this study, Catoca and Camutue have 
been chosen as typifying the principal development options 
for hard-rock diamond mining in Angola. One option is for a 
very large producer of relatively low value stones such as 
Catoca. This would require a large capital investment. The 
other possibility is for a more modest investment in one of 
the smaller pipes that contain better value stones of which 
Camutue is representative.
2.2 Diamond Industry Organization
Historically, Angolan diamond mining was carried out 
under an exclusive fifty-year concession granted to the 
Portuguese firm, Companhia de Diamantes de Angola (Diamang), 
Diamang was a public company in WThich non-Portuguese i n s t i ­
tutional shareholders held some 30% of the equity. Diamang 
had exclusive rights to prospect, for diamonds in Angola and 
was effectively the administrator of the northeast part of 
the country, which was in practice an enclave. The conces­
sion expired in 1970 and other companies were able to take 
up exploration licenses outside of Diamang’s mining areas.
As the largest of these, Condiama, was a Diamang/De Beers 
joint venture, the monopoly was in effect preserved.
At independence the Angolan government gained control 
of Diamang through nationalization of the Portuguese equity.
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Following the enactment of the Mining Law of 1979 the 
Empresa Nacional de Diamantes de Angola (Endiama) was formed 
in 1981 (Jourdan 1986). Endiama is in effect a state mining 
enterprise to which the state has granted the exclusive 
right to mine and explore for diamonds in Angola. Until 1986 
Diamang continued in existence as Endiama1s mining division 
but was dissolved in 1986, whereupon Endiama assumed all 
operational functions.
The role of Endiama is similar to that of Sonangol, the 
state oil company. Endiama holds the rights, but most of the 
physical work is carried out by foreign firms. Operational 
difficulties in the early 1980s obliged Angola to rely on 
foreign companies for managerial and technical support.
These companies operated under service contracts with Diam­
ang (and, later, Endiama) which retained an administrative 
and financial role.
In summary, the exploitation of Angola’s diamond re­
sources has been conducted firstly under a monopolistic 
private enterprise system and then under a state monopoly.
As the recent diamond production record shows, the latter 
system has failed to produce the goods and a move is now 
afoot to reintroduce elements of private enterprise into the 
industry. Recent policy has been to parcel out various 
areas for exploitation under service contract by foreign
T-3945 16
companies of which two (Roan Selection Trust, and Sociedade 
Portuguesa de Empreendimentos) are active at present. To 





The viability of an ore deposit is dependent upon the 
capital and operating cost of the plant needed to exploit 
it, on the revenue received from sale of products, and on 
the fiscal legislation controlling the distribution of the 
income between stakeholders. In this chapter capital and 
operating cost estimates for possible hard-rock mines in 
Angola are derived. In the first part of the chapter a 
parametric model for a hard-rock diamond mine is developed. 
In part two the model is applied to two Angolan kimberlit.es.
3.1 A Cost Model for a Hard-Rock Diamond Mine
Compared to some other processes for recovering miner­
als from hard-rock deposits (e.g., copper) the recovery of 
diamonds from kimberlite deposits is relatively simple. The 
principal reason is that once liberated from the host rock, 
diamonds need no further upgrading prior to sale.
Although diamond recovery plants have been built in 
widely separated parts of the world they tend to be very 
similar. This is because the only hard-rock source of dia­
monds, kimberlite, has a fairly narrow range of metallurgi­
cal characteristics. Recovery plant similarity suggests that
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an adequately specified capital and operating cost model of 
an existing diamond mine should remain valid for mines 
located in other countries (with suitable adjustments for 
differing local costs of the factors of production). The 
objective of this chapter is to build such a model. The 
model will be based on the USBM Cost. Estimating System. A 
r e c e n t l y  constructed diamond mine will be used as a source 
of technical specifications, and as a check of the accuracy 
of cost estimates compared to actual, published costs.
In the past twenty years, seven hard-rock diamond, mines 
have been developed in southern Africa (all but one by De 
Beers) and one has been developed in Australia by CRA. Of 
these eight mines, published information on mine and plant 
specifications and capital costs is available for three: 
Orapa. in Botswana (Allen 1981), Letseng-la-Terai in Lesotho 
(Chadwick 1980) and Argyle in Australia (Lyons 1983; Lang 
1986; Mining Magazine 1985). Of these three possibilities 
the Argyle mine is probably the best suited for modeling:
(1) it has the most complete technical specification of the 
three; (2) it is the newest of the three, representing the 
state of the art in diamond recovery technology; and (3) at 
three million tons per year its throughput is about average 
for a diamond mine. Orapa is twice the size and Letseng-la- 
Terai half the size. A mid-range model was felt to be the
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best basis for extrapolative purposes. For these reasons the 
cost model developed in this study has been based on the 
Argyle mine (fig.3.1).
The costing system -used is based on the USBM Cost Esti­
mating System (USBM, 1987). This is a parametric estimating 
system in the form of a Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet that enables 
the capital and operating cost of a wide variety of mining 
and/or metallurgical processes to be estimated from some 
physical characteristic (e.g., throughput) of the process.
The USBM system is designed with commonplace metallur­
gical applications in mind. To accommodate some of the spe­
cialized processes involved in diamond recovery the spread­
sheet had to be considerably modified.
In the case of the X-ray sorting equipment actual costs of 
the equipment was obtained from a supplier’s quotation and 
from company sources. In other cases (of which the heavy 
media circuit is the main example) a closely related process 
modeled in the USBM system was modified to approximate to 
the diamond plant application. Some parametric equations 
developed elsewhere (Mular 1982) were imported into the USBM 
spreadsheet where they more closely accommodated known pro­
ject characteristics than the standard USBM options.
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Figure 3.1 Simplified Flow Sheet of the Argyle Plant
Source: compiled from: Lang R. 1986. Mining Engineering.
January. 13-16; Mining Magazine. 1985. November. 
406-415.
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3.1.1 Transport Factors
Transport costs strongly influence project capital 
costs. In the case of Argyle and the Angolan deposits, 
transportation is a critical factor as both projects are 
located several thousand kilometers from a the nearest logi­
cal source of equipment and supplies. The USBM system gener­
ates costs for a mine assumed to be located close to Denver 
and supplied from the nearest logical equipment sources. 
There is no standard routine available to factor in the 
effect of different transportation distances and this re­
quired additional spreadsheet modification.
To model the effect of long distance transportation 
location, factors for various categories of supplies and 
equipment were determined and built into the spreadsheet. 
This was done by selecting the current price of representa­
tive items of equipment, such as fabricated structural steel 
components, and determining the appropriate freight rate for 
these articles (Richardson 1990). Freight charges are deter­
mined by the freight classification of the item and its 
weight. Total freight charges are a linear function of dis­
tance and so the delivered cost of an item can be expressed 
as a function of factory price and the transportation dis­
tance .
For a given distance, delivered costs expressed as a
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fraction of the factory price are similar among like items 
(such as screen decks of varying sizes) but vary widely 
between different freight classes. For example, the price of 
various sizes of structural steel shipped 2,100 miles by 
road is 125%-130% of the factory price. Mining equipment 
moved the same distance costs 102%-103% of list price.
Freight factors for major cost items (vehicles, steel, 
process equipment, cement) were built into the default sec­
tion of the spreadsheet and assigned to the various para­
metric equations that determine cost components by subjec­
tively assessing their weight in that component. For exam­
ple, one might judge that the supplies required to install a 
crusher are 80% steel and 20% cement on a factory price 
basis. The appropriate freight factor vTill be a hybrid of 
the steel and building materials factors in those propor­
tions. Freight factors were calculated using 1990 costs 
corrected back to 1984 using appropriate indices to bring 
them into line with the rest of the USBM system which uses 
1984 as a cost base. Although freight factors were calcu­
lated using data for the United States, the spreadsheet 
adjusts for projects in other countries by factoring in the 
local transportation and equipment cost indices. The appro­
priate expression for any freight class is:
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TFf = {CIf+[ (Td-1 ) *TIf *H] }/CIf
where: TF*. = Foreign Transport Factor
CI^ = Foreign Cost Index for item 
T, = United States Transport Factor 
H = Haul Factor 
TIf = Foreign Transport Index
The Foreign Transport Factor is the delivered cost of a 
capital item in a foreign country expressed as a fraction of 
the ex-factory price of the item (CIf) in the same country. 
The terms within the square brackets on the right hand side 
of the equation represent the item’s foreign freight cost. 
This is the cost in the United States over a given distance 
adjusted for differences in transport costs between coun­
tries .
The haul factor represents an attempt.to correct for 
the fact that published freight rates for the United States 
imply that the carrier will be able to pick up a load on 
both legs of a trip. This is obviously not the case in most 
mine supply situations, and it is reasonable to assume that 
carriers will require a premium over standard rates. U.S. 
transport associations confirmed that such logic does apply 
in practice but were unable to quote a specific factor which 
is determined by personal preference in a deregulated and 
highly competitive environment. In this study a factor of 
1.5 was applied somewhat arbitrarily to the case of Argyle 
but set at 1 for the Angolan models where scheduled rail
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transport was assumed to be available.
3.1.2 Plant Model Specifications
The equipment and processes that constitute the metal­
lurgical plant at xArgyle are summarized in fig. 3.1. One 
important point to bear in mind is that the plant has been 
built with expansion in mind. Consequently, although the 
actual current treatment rate is 11,376 tons per day, many 
of the major items of equipment have a significantly greater 
capacity. The primary crusher, for example, has a throughput 
capacity of 42,545 tons per day based on data from other 
installations (S.M.E. Handbook 1985). Capital costs have 
been based on this rated capacity and not on plant through­
put. In the following sections, details are given on hex,- the 
items shown in the flow sheet have been incorporated into 
the USBM spreadsheet. Only brief notes on the spreadsheet 
settings are given where they have been modified to suit 
this model. The reader is referred to the USBM handbook for 
details of possible adjustments that can be handled by the 
system.
Crushing Circuit. Argyle has a primary and secondary crusher 
which feeds onto a stockpile. The ore is reclaimed from the 
stockpile, fed into two scrubbers and the oversize from the
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scrubbers passes on to a single tertiary cone crusher. The 
three crushers were modeled in the spreadsheet under 
"Crushing" with the final product set to 25 millimeters 
instead of the default setting of 12.7 millimeters.
Stockpiles. There are two stockpiles at 'Argyle. One acts as 
a buffer ahead of the scrubbers, the other as a buffer ahead 
of the heavy media cyclones. The former is the larger and 
was modeled under ’’Stockpile Reclaim" at 11376 tpd capacity. 
The second stockpile was visually estimated at 75% of the 
first. Total cost of both was taken at 17 5% of the larger 
stockpile alone.
Scrubbers. Kimberlite has a tendency to develop a claylike 
consistency, and diamond plants go to extremes to remove 
this clay which interferes with the heavy media cyclone 
efficiency. Rotating trommels or scrubbers are the first 
step in this process and Argyle has two. The scrubbers can 
be modeled in the USBM system under the "Washing" option.
The potential capacity of each scrubber was assumed to be 
related to the potential capacity of the primary crusher.
The capacity of each was set at half the capacity of the 
primary crusher.
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Heav.y Media Separation, The USBM system provides for heavy 
media separation in its list of options but the parametric 
equations are geared towards coal washing in a drum separa­
tor rather than the cyclone system used In diamond plants. 
The two systems are similar to the extent that they use 
similar methods of feed preparation and media handling, but 
they differ in the type of separation vessel (drum versus 
cyclone). Furthermore, drum-based systems are relatively 
compact installations, cyclone units are tall and thin owing 
to the gravity fed nature of the process. For the purpose of 
this study, it was felt that a reasonable approximation of a 
cyclone unit with a nominal 100 tph capacity could be ar­
rived at by applying the following adaptations to the USBM 
model.
-A parametric equation for drum separators was derived 
using manufacturers quotations for drum capacities in the 
range of 40 to 130 tons per hour.
-The price of a 100 tph unit was subtracted from the 
equipment cost of the USBM heavy media unit leaving 
the cost of the ancillary screening and media handling 
equ i pment.
-The cost of three cyclones (there are three per he a v y  
media module and six modules in all) ua.s estimated using 
parametric equations developed by Mular (1982) and this
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was added to the cost of the stripped-out drum separator 
plant.
-A steel structure to house the six heavy media units was 
estimated at 1984 prices using estimates of dimensions 
taken from site photos and applying these figures to the 
Dodge building estimating system (Dodge 1986).
Recrush Circuit.. The recrush circuit performs the function 
of recrushing the coarser sizes of tailings from the heavy 
media circuit to liberate any small diamonds that may have 
been locked up inside rock fragments. As is the case with 
the primary crushing circuit, the recrush circuit has been 
designed with future expansion in mind and the throughput 
capacity of the crushers (there are three) exceeds the cur­
rent throughput. In the spreadsheet a capacity of 340 tph 
was used as a design figure (the capacity of similar crush­
ers producing a similar product, S.M.E. 1985). The crushing 
model in the USBM system allows such tertiary crushing to be 
modeled, but it assumes the crusher feed is run of mine in 
size and not the actual one-inch feed in this case. This 
problem was overcome by modifying the appropriate equations 
so that, in effect, two capital costs were modeled. One was 
for reduction of ore from run of mine to one inch arid the 
o the r was for reduction from run of mine to a quarter of an
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inch, the actual final product. The difference between the 
two represents the capital cost of equipment to reduce from 
an inch to a quarter of an inch, the designed function of 
the recrush section.
Audit Plant. The function of the audit plant is to monitor 
the efficiency of the main heavy media plant by checking 10 
per cent of the tailing's of that plant for diamond content. 
It is in effect a small heavy media plant in its own right 
coupled with a single X-ray sorter which evaluates the con­
centrate produced. This unit was modeled by a single 
50 tph heavy media unit (based on the main heavy media mod­
el) housed in a building one quarter the size of the heavy 
media building. The audit plant also contains one X-ray 
sorter that was priced at a lump sum.
X-ray Sorting. All contemporary diamond mines utilize dia­
mond fluorescence under X-rays to separate them from the 
rest of the concentrate produced by a heavy media plant. It 
cannot be realistically approximated by any of the processes 
included in the USBM system and has been modeled here by a 
lump sum. This sum is the actual cost of the installation 
based of information given to M. von Saldern by Argyle 
(personal communication M. von Saldern). A further point is
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that the equipment employed at Argyle was designed specifi­
cally to handle the large quantities of diamonds produced 
which would tend to swamp conventional sorting equipment. In 
applying the model to other situations (i.e., Angola) con­
ventional sorting machines will be modeled. In practice this 
will amount to more, but cheaper, machines and the total 
cost is much the same, The cost of X-ray recovery installa­
tions tend to be of a fixed size, independent of the mine 
size .
3.1.3 Mine Model Specifications
The open pit mine at Argyle has only two major capital 
cost components that require modeling. One is the cost of 
the mining equipment and the other is the cost of stripping 
some twenty million tons of waste rock prior to production, 
an operation carried out by a contractor. A drainage system 
was not required as initially the mine was drained by gravi­
ty .
The mining equipment used at Argyle has much in common 
with other open pit operations of comparable size, but dif­
fers in two respects. First, much of the overburden is 
ripped by bulldozer rather than drilled and blasted. Conse­
quently the mine has a greater number of bulldozers than 
typical operations and fewer drills. Second, the mine does
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not use electric shovels to load ore but relies on large 
front-end loaders. The USBM system provides an electric 
shovel and truck model for operations of the scale of Argyle 
(in which large front-end loaders can be substituted for 
electric shovels), but given the above differences in equip­
ment the writer had some doubt as to its applicability to 
the Argyle case.
The capital cost of mining equipment was modeled in two 
ways. As actual equipment listings have been published 
(Lang 1986) the cost of this equipment was modeled by im­
porting appropriate parametric equations (Mular 1982) and 
summing to a total. Secondly, the standard USBM electric 
shovel model was applied after making standard corrections 
for the pit depth and haul distance. The former method sug­
gested a capital cost of US$18.2 million while the latter 
gave a figure of US$19.7 million. This close agreement sug­
gests that either method is acceptable. For general applica­
tion, the generic USBM model is probably the more robust., 
but in the case of Argyle the estimate based on individual 
items was retained. As a further check of the overall reli­
ability of the Mular equations, certain items of equipment 
were estimated using January 1989 indices. The estimates 
were then compared with list prices (Western Mining Cost 
Service 1990). The results are set out below and, with the
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exception of the 992C front end loader, show good agreement
Estimate Actual Variance
(US$) (US$)
Cat.D9L 517,858 498,985 +3.8%
Cat.777 616,772 615,863- 657,304 +0.1%, -6.6%
Cat.99 2C 696,327 860, 810 -23.6%
GD-100 1,043,802 1,17 2,049-1,195,968 -12.3%, -14,6%
The prestripping of waste by a contractor is specifi­
c a l l y  catered for in the USBM system. However, establishment 
in such a remote location is likely to be a significant 
item. Establishment charges were modeled by calculating the 
delivery cost of the same equipment if it had been pur­
chased, and doubling it to account for the return journey.
3.1.4 Exploration Costs
The evaluation of diamond deposits differs from the 
evaluation of, say, metallic deposits because of the ex­
tremely lowr concentrations of the target commodity in rela­
tion to the host rock. Even at Argyle, a rich deposit by 
world standards, the ratio is only one part in a million. 
These factors mean that very extensive bulk sampling and 
pilot plant work is necessary. Large samples of diamonds are 
also required to establish reliable estimates of value and, 
as a result, diamond exploration has a different cost struc-
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ture from other commodities.
In total A$49 million (US$35 million) was spent on the 
evaluation of the Argyle pipe (Janse 1988) representing 13% 
of the final total capital expenditure of A$420 million. At 
Orapa in Botswana, evaluation costs amounted to 29% of all 
other capital costs combined (Allen 1978).
There are similarities between Orapa and Argyle which 
suggest that exploration costs as a proportion of other 
capital costs should be comparable. Both projects are in dry 
remote areas and have a similar operating environment. Eval­
uation techniques at both are similar, a mixture of drilling 
and bulk sampling with material being treated in pilot heavy 
media plants. The original Orapa plant at 3.5 million tons 
per year was the same size as Argyle. However, Orapa is a 
bigger deposit (110 hectares c.f. 45.hectares) and this 
probably inflated the cost of exploration relative to the 
cost of the plant above that at Argyle. Taking the size 
difference of the two deposits into account brings their 
evaluation costs into close agreement. In essence, the eval­
uation of a 45 hectare Orapa would should have cost 12% of 
all other capital costs (cf 13% at Argyle). Implicit in this 
calculation is the assumption that all evaluation costs are 
variable (and this is a debatable point). To estimate the 
evaluation costs for kimberlites of a given area and plant
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size one should:
1. Adjust the 12 percent figure pro rata relative to a 
45 hectare base,
2.' Adjust for the difference in mine capital cost rela­
tive to the cost of a 3 to 3.5 million ton per year base.
This can be accomplished by using the "six-tenths rule” 
that states, as a first approximation, capital cost is 
proportional to c a p a c i t y  raised to the power of 0.6.
3.1.5 Capitalized Interest
Argyle was financed by a mixture of debt and equity.
The debt portion (US$235 million) was raised in New York in 
the form of commercial paper at variable interest rates 
(Conzinc Rio Tinto Australia, Annual Report 1984). During 
the construction period the interest rate on such instru­
ments, varied between 8% and 10.9%. To estimate the pro­
portion of the Argyle capital cost which is accounted for by 
capitalized interest, the interest on debt was capitalized 
at 10%. An additional simplifying assumption made was that 
the project was wholly funded by debt.
The interest incurred on debt during the construction 
period is treated as a capital cost (rather than an expense) 
because the project earns no income during construction, and 
so there is no cash flow to service the debt. The interest
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due on the money borrowed is debited to the capital account, 
in effect increasing the level of debt above the nominal 
amount that was borrowed. This increases the capital cost of 
the project. The degree to which capitalized interest in­
creases project cost depends on the degree of debt leverage, 
interest rates, the length of the construction period, and 
the pattern of expenditure during the construction period.
The development of the Argyle pipe spanned the period 
1982 to 1985. In 1982 and 1983 evaluation and engineering 
design was carried out. In 1984 and 1985 the plant and in­
frastructure was built and the mine was developed. The pro­
ject was commissioned in December 1985. Table 3.1 shows how 
capital expenditures have been distributed through time 
based on the authors estimates,
Table 3.1 Argyle Expenditure Schedule 
(US$ millions)
Capital Item 1982 1983 1984 1985
I tern 
Total
Exploration 23 . 2 23 . 2
Engineering Design 1 . 8 1 . 8 0.4 4 . 0
Construction Management 5.8 5.8 11.6
Mill & Infrastructure 61.4 61.4 122.8
Mine Development 14.1 14.1 28 . 2
Mine Equipment 19 . 2 19.2
Working Capital 7.6 7 .6
Year Total 25.0 1 .8 81 . 7 108.1 216.6
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3.1.6 Model Performance
The capital and operating cost estimates for the Argyle 
mine model based on the USBM Cost Estimating System with the 
modifications set described in the preceding sections are 
set out in Table 3.2. Where actual costs are these are set 
out in parentheses next to the estimated figure. According 
to engineers familiar with Argyle the actual final escalated 
(i.e., including inflation) capital cost of the Argyle Mine 
was A$420 million. The model therefore underestimates the 
true cost by just under 20%, or A$70 million.
Table 3.2 Capital and Operating Cost Estimates for the 
Argyle Mine Model




l.Mill & Infrastructure 144.0 7 . 44
2 .Mine 4 9.2 (50.5) 6 . 66
3.Exploration 23.2 (34.3)
4.Capitalized Interest 29.0
Total US$ 245 . 4 14 . 10
Total A$
(@ US$1 = A$1.427) 350.2 (420) 20.12 (16.99)
Note: Actual costs are shown in parentheses. Sources of 
actual costs are given in the text.
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Given the approximations that had to be made to fit 
plant processes to the models available in the USBM System, 
the agreement between the two figures is considered quite 
good. If one considers this estimate to be p r e l i m i n a r y  or 
Class II (Mular 1982, 8) then final costs can be expected to
be +30% to -15% of the estimate.
Some discrepancies can be identified. Estimated evalua­
tion costs are less than they actually were (US$23.2 million 
c.f. US$35 million). It is also suspected that the model may 
not be fully specified. Company annual reports mention 
extensive training of staff in Perth to sort the diamonds 
(and possibly the purchase of sorting equipment) which may 
also have been considered part of the project cost.
In conclusion the model seems to function reasonably 
well, and with appropriate adjustments for local conditions, 
should serve as a fair estimate of potential projects else­
where . However, any such application will require a fairly 
large contingency.
3.2 Cost Estimates for Angolan Kimberlites
In this section the hard-rock diamond mine cost model 
developed in the preceding chapter will be applied to the 
Catoca. and Camutue kimberlites with due allowance being made 
for local conditions and deposit characteristics. The oapi-
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tal and operating costs derived will be used as input to the 
financial models developed in Chapter 6,
It is taken as a given that kimberlite development in 
Angola will only proceed once the current conflict has been 
resolved. As this, in turn, is linked to a resolution of 
South Africa's domestic political problems it seems reason­
able to assume that a peaceful Angola will come hand in hand 
with a South Africa that is politically acceptable to other 
African nations. This would be crucial to kimberlite devel­
opment as South Africa is probably the most cost-effective 
source of construction and operational supplies. Angola 
simpl y does not have the industrial capability to undertake 
major mine development and neither do any of its neighbors.
The kimberlite prospects examined here are linked by 
275 to 400 kilometers of black-top road and 3,450 kilome­
ters of rail to South Africa’s industrial centers. This is 
a long distance (though comparable to Argyle-Perth) but the 
alternative sources of supply are 900 to 1 , 100 kilometers to 
Angola's ports and then at least an ocean away. This sug­
gests that capital costs would be best measured in terms of 
South African costs (where most fabrication would take 
place) with due allowance for the effect of the long trans­
portation distances.
While a pool of the needed artisans would be available
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locally within Endiama’s operations, the need to minimize 
construction time would likely mandate the use of skilled 
expatriate construction crews. Once again the logical source 
of this labor is South Africa, and a realistic assumption is 
to use South African wage rates with an expatriate premium.
Many of the skills required to operate a kimberlite 
mine and plant are the same as those involved in operating 
an alluvial plant. It is realistic to assume that any opera­
tion could be fully staffed locally with only management 
being recompensed at expatriate rates. However, it is de­
batable whether the current Angolan system of imposed wage 
rates and controlled prices would remain valid under the 
conditions necessary to foster investment. As will be seen 
from table 5.1 Angolan wage rates are at least double those 
in neighboring countries when converted to dollars at the 
official rate. To encourage investment, one has to assume 
that either the investor will be granted a "parallel" ex­
change rate or that the economic order will shift towards 
that prevailing in neighboring countries. In these the pur­
chasing power of wages bears some resemblance to the prices 
of goods required to motivate performance. At the moment 
this is not the case in .Angola. Under the current Soviet 
style system, goods are officially cheap but rarely avail­
able at official prices. Presumably an Angola that is at­
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tractive to investors will have to reach some equilibrium 
with its neighbors as far as wages are concerned. Whether 
this is by gross devaluation of the kwanza or by concession­
ary exchange rates is immaterial. For projects of equal 
technical merit, investors will stay away if the hard cur­
rency costs of operating in Angola are much higher than 
elsewhere. For the purpose of this study it may be useful to 
apply mine labor costs in a comparable country with a market 
economy that can be taken as a model of the future Angola. 
Botswana provides a suitable model given the dominance of 
diamonds in that country’s mining industry wage structure. 
Costs will also be calculated at the official exchange rate 
to determine the effect on project economics.
The USBM Cost Estimating System makes an allowance for 
the relative productivity of labor in different countries 
w h e n  computing costs. For Botswana the USBM figure for mine 
labor productivity relative to the United States is 48.8%. 
There are problems in accepting this figure at face value as 
it incorporates the aggregate mining industry productivity 
of both countries and makes no allowance for differences in 
the cost structures of different mining industries.
Productivity data is available for Orapa in Botswana 
(Allen 1978) where production averaged 3,150 tons per man 
year between 1973 and 1975. In order to arrive at a more
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industry specific figure for labor productivity the cost 
model developed in the previous chapter was used to estimate 
labor operating costs for a hypothetical similar operation 
in the United States for 1975, This simulation indicated 
labor costs of $1.53 per metric ton (out of a total operat­
ing cost of $4.00 per ton). This figure combined with the 
1975 mining wage rate of $5.90 per hour and assuming a 250- 
shift working year suggests an American productivity figure 
of 7,712 metric tons per man year (this figure does not 
change significantly years other than 1975). On this basis 
productivity in Botswana (and by inference, Angola) is 4 1% 
of United States productivity and is the figure used in the 
cost models.
The figure used to account for interest capitalization 
during construction was 10.16%. This represents the London 
Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) for 1989 plus a 1% risk premi­
um. This figure was established in discussions with the 
International Finance Corporation (telephone interview with 
S. McCleod) as a reasonable rate for sovereign loans to that 
part of the world. For corporate loans the risk premium was 
2.5%.
As the projects are denominated in dollars, project 
costs were escalated at 4% per year. This figure represents 
the GNP price deflator for the United States in 1989. While
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inflation in Southern Africa in recent years has been con­
siderably more than 4% this has been largely offset by 
exchange rate depreciation. In dollar terms inflation has 
moved in parallel with the United States.
3.2.1. Catoca Description and Model Specification
The Catoca prospect is a large kimberlite with, a sur­
face area of 66 hectares. At the surface it is roughly cir­
cular in shape and about 800 meters in diameter 
(Lyons, 1983). The average grade is 0.6 carats per ton. Dia­
monds are of poor quality. In 1977 they were valued at 6 15 
per carat, which suggests they are predominantly of indus­
trial or cheap gem quality. Catoca is located 25 kilometers 
northwest of Saurimo (fig. 2.2) which has an airstrip capa­
ble of handling a Boeing 737. A black-top road passes within 
5 kilometers of the prospect and links up with the railway 
at Luena, 250 kilometers to the south. The nearest point on 
the Endiama power grid is at Lucapa, 125 kilometers to the 
north. Catoca lies in gently rolling savanna country on the 
west bank of a small river. This river, the Lova, contained 
high grade alluvial deposits derived from the pipe and has 
been mined out. Water flow is adequate to service any likely 
mine .
Suitable accommodation would not be available locally
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and a permanent townsite would be required for at least the 
expatriate staff. A single status/commute system could be 
devised for the Angolan labor which would almost certainly 
be recruited from the established diamond communities to the 
north. Married accommodations for management and hostels for 
commuting labor has been assumed in the model.
A considerable amount of large diameter drilling was 
carried out at Catoca before independence which would reduce 
the amount of additional evaluation (perhaps by 50?4) re­
quired to bring the pipe into production. A figure of 6% of 
all other capital costs has been used to allow for evalua­
tion costs.
The size of Catoca makes large-scale mining possible 
and the poor quality diamonds suggest that economies of 
scale will be necessary if the pipe is to prove viable. For 
these reasons an open pit mine and mill w’ith a capacity of 7 
million tons per year will be modeled. The choice is some­
what arbitrary and is influenced by Orapa which has similar 
grade and stone quality and which has a throughput of 7 
million tons per year. Given the size of the pipe, it is not 
anticipated that waste stripping would be required for many 
years, a consideration built into the model.
The options for the power supply are to generate it 
locally using diesel sets or to install a transmission line
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to the existing power grid to the north. Orapa (Allen 1981) 
consumes about 10 MW in the treatment of kimberlite at the 
modeled rate. Endiama generating capacity is 16 MW at pres­
ent with the possibility of expansion to 18 MW (Helmore, 
1986). Without knowing the power demand of existing opera­
tions, one cannot say whether there would be enough power 
left over for Catoca. In this case, electric power genera­
tion by diesel has been assumed.
One assumption underlying ^the modeling is that the 
costs are calculated from the perspective of 1989 which 
represents project Year 0. Project construction would occur 
in subsequent years and this requires a time/expenditure 
schedule to capture the effects of interest capitalization 
and cost escalation. The expenditure schedule is set out in 
table 3.3 where the expenditure in any one year is distrib­
uted as a percentage of the capital item total (and not as a 
dollar amount).
3.2.2 Camutue Description and Model Specification
Camutue is a medium-sized kimberlite with a surface 
area of 9 hectares located 8 kilometers east of Lucapa with­
in the established diamond mining area (fig. 2.2). It was 
mined as an open pit up until 1975 when it closed down after 
the Portuguese left. The pit has a current depth of about 40
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Table 3.3 Catoca Capital Expenditure Schedule Excluding. 
Capitalized Interest and Escalation 
(% of item total)
Row
1990 1991 1992 1993 Total
Explorat i on 100 100
Engineering Design 4 5 45 10 100
Construction Management 50 5 0 100
Mill & Infrastructure 50 50 100
Mine Development 50 50 100
Mine Equipment 100 100
Working Capital 100 100
Total 6.6 1 . 0 4 3.5 48 . 9 100
meters but the treatment plant is obsolete. Diamang records 
suggest that some 10 million tons of ore remain at a grade 
of 0.12 carats per ton. Camutue contains exceptional quality 
diamonds for a kimberlite. valued at $130 per carat in 1977 
(see table 2.2). A second pipe, Caixepa is located four- 
kilometers to the east. Caixepa is smaller at 2.3 hectares 
but contains better stones at a slightly lower grade. For 
the purposes of this model, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the two pipes together should be capable of supporting 
a million-ton-per-year operation for a decade. In the text 
the terms "Camutue" and "Camutue/Caixepa" are synonymous and 
refer to joint exploitation of adjacent deposits.
Unlike Catoca, both pipes would require some waste 
stripping by virtue of their geometry. A ratio of two to one
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appears reasonable to the writer from personal knowledge of 
the area.
The infrastructure around Camutue is good. Powder is 
available from the Endiama grid and the required Angolan 
labor is established in the area. In all probability no 
accommodation would have to be built other than for expatri­
ate staff. The Lucapa airstrip is dirt but can accommodate 
large transport aircraft. The road system is black top and 
links to the railway at Luena 375 kilometers distant. Dirt 
service roads would require upgrading.
xAs with Catoca, both Camutue and Caixepa have been 
drilled out and little if any additional evaluation would be 
required. An allowance of 3% of other capital costs should 
be sufficient to capture the impact of this item.
The estimated capital expenditure schedule for Camutue 
is set out in table 3.4. As with fig. 3.3 the figures repre­
sent percentages of the capital item total (and not dollar 
amounts).
A modern diamond recovery plant was built in 1986 at 
Lucapa (Diamond International 1990) and would probably be 
able to handle the modest quantities of stones from 
Camutue/Caixepa. X-ray sorters would be required between the 
secondary and tertiary crushers to detect and remove large 
stones. A system similar to that used at Letseng-la-Terai in
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Lesotho (Chadwick 1980) was incorporated into the Camutue 
model.
Table 3.4 Camutue Capital Expenditure Schedule Excluding 
Capitalized Interest and Escalation 
(% of item total)




Engineering Design 45 45 10 100
Construction Management 50 50 100
Mill & Infrastructure 50 50 100
Mine Development 50 5 0 100
Mine Equipment 100 100
Working Capital 100 100
Total 3.8 0.8 43.6 51.8 100
3.2.3 Cost Estimate for Catoca
A 7 million ton per year open pit mine and treatment 
plant was modeled for Catoca using the USBM Cost Estimating 
System. The model specifications conform to those set out in 
section 3.2.1. The summary of capital and operating costs is 
set out below. Operating costs represent 1989 prices and 
will be escalated before inclusion in the financial model. 
The total capital cost is the estimated final, finished cost 
of the mine and plant. The rate at which interest is capi­
talized assumes 100% debt finance. This was done for the 
sake of simplicity. In reality a proportion of equity fi-
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nance would be employed and this generally costs more than 
debt. The contingency factor used, 20%, was selected on the 
basis of by how much the modeled cost of Argyle was observed
to fall below actual final cost.
The breakdown of the components of the cost estimate is set 
out below.
Estimated Capital Cost (US$millioris)
1. Treatment Plant and Infrastructure . ...........  177,0
2. Open Pit M i n e ..................................... 28.1
3. Exploration @ 6% of Item 1+2 . . . . .  ......... 12.3
4. Interest Capitalized (10.16%).................... 51.8
5. Escalation (4%)... ................................ 36,7
6. Contingency @ 20% of Items 1 & 2 .... .............  43.5
Total Escalated Capital Cost ..................  3 4 9.4
Estimated Operating Cost (US$/metric ton)
1. Treatment Plant
& Infrastructure: L a b o r .......... ...........0.67
Equipment Operation . . . . 0.89
Suppl i e s .................... 2.52
2. Mining: L a b o r ......................0.30
Equipment Operation . . . . 0.69
S u p p l i e s .................... 0.29
T o t a l ...................... 5.34
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3.2.4 Cost, Estimate for Camutue
A one million ton-per-year open pit mine and treatment 
plant was modeled for the Camutue/Caixepa pipes. The model 
specifications are those set out in section 3.2.2. The 
summary of capital and operating costs (in 1988 dollars) 
follows.
Estimated Capital Cost (USSmi11 ions)
1. Treatment Plant and Infrastructure . . . . . . .  48.7
2. Open Pit M i n e ...............  10.4
3. Exploration @ 3% of Items 1 + 2 ................... 1.8
4. Interest Capitalized (at 10.16%)   13.7
5. Escalation........................................ 10.6
6 . Contingency @ 20% of Items 1 & 2   12,2
Total Escalated Capital Cost  .................... 9 7. 4
Estimated Operating Cost (US$/metric ton)
1. Treatment Plant
& Infrastructure: Labor ......................  2.17
Equipment Operation . . , . 2.04
Suppl i e s .................. 3,43
2. Mining: L a b o r ................ .. 2.31
Equipment Operation . . . . 5.11
Suppl i e s .................. 1.61
T o t a l ....................16,68
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CHAPTER 4
MARKET STRUCTURE AND PRICE ESTIMATION
The previous chapter established estimates of the
likely costs associated with building and operating diamond 
mines in Angola. In this chapter the structure of diamond 
markets are briefly described. Historical product i on dale 
from Angola is combined with published material on diamond 
price trends to predict future time series trends for Ango­
lan diamonds.
4.1 Market Structure
Diamonds are not a homogenous commodity but occur in 
some three thousand different grades and specifications 
which can be best regarded as forming a continuum. At the
low end of the scale are small, flawed, misshapen, and poor
color stones which are suitable only for crushing to powder 
for polishing applications. Diamonds such as this sell for 
about a dollar per carat. At the other end of the spectrum 
are large, flawless, colored gems which can fetch tens of 
thousands of dollars per carat. In terms of industrial orga­
nization there is also a variation in market structure 
across the same continuum. At the industrial end the market 
approximates to a competitive structure while the gem market
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approaches a monopoly.
There are two sources of industrial diamonds, natural 
stones and synthetics. Natural industrial diamonds occur in 
varying proportions with gems in all diamond deposits. The 
proportion of industrials can be as much as 98% by weight 
(as at Miba in Zaire) or as little as 2% {as in Namibia). In 
terms of relative value in a given mine, industrial diamonds 
are invariably subordinate to gems and near gems and can be 
regarded as byproducts or, occasionally, as co-products. In 
1988 the world mine capacity for industrial diamonds was 
about 80 million carats, most of which was controlled by the 
Central Selling Organization.
Synthetic industrial diamonds compete with and are in 
many respects superior to the smaller sizes of natural 
stones. The superiority stems from the ability to produce 
material to close mechanical specifications during manufac­
ture and also from the fact that sintered composites can 
also be produced as required. In the past thirty years the 
production of synthetics has grown from nothing to about 370 
million carats a year. In 1988 eleven countries produced 
over a million carats a year, and of the total production 
only 110 million carats are controlled by De Beers. Competi­
tion between manufacturers, increasing economies of scale, 
and learning curve effects have combined to steadily push
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down the price of industrial diamonds with time and in the 
process the price of low quality natural stones has also 
declined. However, it is still uneconomical to synthesize 
large monolithic industrial diamonds suitable for drilling. 
In this sector natural stones have maintained their position 
and appreciated in price. Between these two extremes there 
has been some substitution of natural drill stones by 
polycrystaline composites. The impact of this relative pene­
tration of industrials into the historical market of natural 
diamonds can be seen in the price trend data set out below. 
Prices are in current dollars per carat. The data source is 
USBM Bulletin 675, Mineral Facts and Problems, 1985.
Average 0.7 5 Carat 
Synthetic Natural Natural Natural
Year Grit Gr i t Stones Drill S tone
1974 3.75 3.95 5.95 93.7
1984 1.34 1.19 7.56 120.15
It should be noted that the effects of competition decrease 
from left to right in the above data. Large natural stones 
have no synthetic competitors and their supply is controlled 
by De Beers/Central Selling Organization.
From the point of view of diamond cutters, the market 
for gem diamonds approximates a monopoly with the
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DeBeers/Central Selling Organization in the role of monopo­
list or, at the very least, the dominant firm. From the 
viewpoint of producers the market resembles a monopsony, 
once again with the C.S.O. in the leading role. About 70% of 
gem diamond sales are controlled by the C.S.O. with the 
remainder sold directly by fringe producers at C.S.O.-linked 
prices. The reasons for such a market structure has evolved 
from the fact that, as gems have no intrinsic value, their 
value lies purely in perceptions of rarity. To preserve this 
perception supply has to be carefully controlled. De Beers 
manages this by guaranteeing to purchase and stockpile gems 
at set prices come hell or high water and has the financial 
muscle to do so. It is in no producer's interest to rock the 
boat by discounting prices, and so the monopoly has remained 
stable for a long time. As a result the price of gem dia­
monds has shown a fairly steady upward increase in both real 
and nominal terms over a long period in contrast to the 
mixed fortunes of industrial diamonds.
4.2 Price Estimation
Time series data for the prices of three representative 
classes of diamonds, gems, near gems and industrials is 
presented in fig. 4.1. The data for the first two categories 
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Figure 4.1 Current Dollar Diamond Price Index 
Source: USBM
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series has been constructed from USBM statistics on the 
value of South African industrial diamonds imported into the 
United States. South African statistics were used in pref­
erence to other possible measures because (a) there were no 
changes in the number of producing mines over the time peri­
od tracked, and (b) the data is weighted towards Finsch Mine 
whose stones are similar to those at Catoca.
Historical production/evaluation price data is avail­
able for the kimberlites evaluated in this study. In 197 7 
Camutue diamonds were worth $ 130/carat and Catoca stones 
were valued at $15/carat. Comparative 1977 prices for the 
three diamond categories which comprise the above index were 
$185/carat for gems, $19/carat for near gems and $6.2 4/carat 
for industrials. By comparing the two sets of data it should 
be apparent that Camutue production was dominated by large 
gems. The valuation for Catoca lies between the value of 
industrials and gems indicating that it contains both 
industrials and more valuable diamonds.
The proportion of industrial diamonds, gems and near 
gems in Catoca is not known. However, one can construct an 
infinite number of hypothetical mixtures of the three class­
es which have a value of $15/carat, any one of which might 
represent reality. Three such mixes (thought to represent 
the most likely stone combinations) were constructed and
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updated to 1988 (the base year for extrapolation). The time 
series for these mixtures are plotted in fig. 4.2 where it 
can be seen that there is no great difference in the extrap­
olated prices which range from $2 2.7/carat to $2 3.3/carat. A 
figure of $23.0/carat was adopted for the purpose of price 
extrapolation. Although the true composition of Catoca 
diamonds is unknown the close agreement of the three models 
enables one to have confidence that the true figure is 
probably not much different.
Given the probable very high proportion of gems in the 
Camutue kimberlite it is reasonable to assume that the price 
of these stones can be updated using the Antwerp Gem Index 
alone. On this basis the 1989 price of Camutue diamonds is 
estimated at $214/carat.
To arrive at an estimate of future values of the dia­
monds in the two prospects the following assumptions have 
been made:
1. Based on the projections of Johnson et al. (1989) the
real price of gems should increase at the rate of 1.5% a 
year they have maintained since 1960. The reasoning be­
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Figure 4.2 Price Time Series for Various Percentages of 
Industrial, Gem, and Near Gem Diamonds in 
the Catoca Kimberlite
Source: USBM; Central Selling Organization
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2. Johnson et al. (1989) suggest that the supply of near
gems should grow at about half the rate of gem supply 
growth to the end of the century. On this basis the price 
of near gems should increase faster than that of gems.
For the purpose of this study a conservative, real price 
increase of near gems equivalent to that of gem diamonds 
(i.e 1.5%) has been assumed.
3. The USBM suggests that the price of average indus­
trial stones decreased by 7% a year over the decade 
prior to 1988. However this decline was from a histori­
cally high peak and includes the one-off effect of an 
extra 20 to 30 million carats a year from Argyle. Assum­
ing that large synthetics will remain uneconomic there 
is no compelling reason to assume a continued decline 
and in this study a constant price in current dollars 
has been assumed.
3. Inflation over the forecast period was assumed to be 1%.
These considerations were used to extrapolate likely 
prices for Camutue and Catoca diamonds to the year 2020. The 
results for Catoca are plotted in fig. 4.3 which consists of 
an extrapolation of the fig. 4.2 time series with the addi­
tion of the mean of the three trends deflated to constant 
1988 dollars. The actual prices for Camutue and Catoca used 
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Figure 4.3 Forecast Price Trends for Various Percentages of 
Industrial, Near Gem, and Gem Diamonds in the 
Catoca Kimberlite
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Table 4.1 Price Forecasts for Catoca and Camutue'
CATOCA CAMUTUE
Year Current 1988 Current 1988
$/carat $/carat $/carat $/carat
1988 24 24 185 185
1989 26 25 214 192
1990 27 25 225 2 0 0
1991 28 25 2 38 208
1992 29 25 251 216
1993 31 25 26 5 225
1994 32 2 5 279 234
1995 3 3 2 5 295 2 43
1996 3 5 25 311 253
1997 36 25 328 263
1998 38 25 346 274
1999 39 26 36 5 285
2000 41 26 385 296
2001 43 26 406 308
2002 45 26 428 320
2003 47 26 452 3 3 3
2004 49 26 477 346
2005 5 1 26 503 360
2006 54 27 531 374
2007 5 6 27 560 389
2008 59 27 591 405
2009 62 27 623 421
2010 65 27 658 438
2011 68 28 694 4 56
2012 71 28 732 472
2013 75 28 772 493
2014 78 28 815 512
2015 82 29 859 533
2016 86 29 907 554
2017 91 29 957 5 56
2018 95 29 1009 579
2019 100 30 106 5 623
2020 105 30 1123 648
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Chapter 5 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND TAXATION
In the preceding two chapters estimates were derived 
for the likely costs oft and revenues from, hard-rock dia­
mond mining in'Angola. Project costs and revenues determine 
the level of operating profit but project attractiveness as 
an investment is also dependent on the impact of fiscal 
legislation. Fiscal legislation determines how profits will 
be distributed. This chapter will examine how current Ango­
lan legislation (and possible alternatives) interacts with 
geological , market, and engineering realities facing' 
kimberlite development in Angola. The net objective is to 
determine a fiscal system which encourages investment and 
maximizes benefits to stakeholders.
5 . 1 Current. Angolan Mineral Legislation
In Angola, legislation that has proved successful in 
promoting investment has been enacted to regulate the petro­
leum industry. Petroleum contracts in Angola can take the 
form of production-sharing agreements or joint ventures with 
foreign oil companies (Barrows 1983). With such a system 
Angola has been able to attract foreign investment, though 
whether that is because of natural endowment or perceived
T-3945 61
legislative fairness is debatable. In comparison, mining 
legislation has failed to attract any significant invest­
ment; the law is currently under review. From various frag­
mentary sources it is possible to estimate the format the 
revised version may finally take, but definitive legislation 
has yet to materialize.
The two pieces of legislation that currently guide 
mining in Angola are the Law on Geological and Mining Activ­
ities of 1979 and the Law* on Foreign Investments of 1988.
The former is generally held to have failed to attract in­
vestment and the latter represents a provisional attempt to 
improve matters.
The 1979 law established the state’s exclusive right, to 
conduct mineral exploration and to exploit mineral resources 
in Angola. Foreign companies were allowed to participate but 
only on a service contract basis. This has been the basis of 
three contracts with different companies (Mining and Techni­
cal Services, Roan Selection Trust, and Sociedade Portuguese 
de Emprendimentos) who have provided technical and manageri­
al services to the diamond mines from 1979 to the present. 
Apai't from these contracts and a few aid-based projects 
there has been no private investment in any other Angolan 
mineral sector since independence. According to United 
Nations personnel who have advised the Angolan government on
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mineral legislation (R. Brown, 1990) the RST contract is 
"cost. plus". Under a "cost plus" contract the contractor 
recovers his costs out of production and earns a management 
fee dependent on production. Arrangements such as this 
differ from revenue sharing in that the contractors use 
plants that have already been built arid paid for and make no 
major capital investment of their own. Such contracts are in 
effect management contracts. Capital for small-scale capital 
investment arid replacement is furnished by Diamang/Endiama 
out of current earnings. The contractors have operational 
but not administrative control.
In 1987 the 1979 law was amended to allow foreign equi­
ty participation and. apparently, even foreign majority 
share holdings {Diamond International 1990),
The Law on Foreign Investments of 1988 provides for 
foreign investment in Angola in several modes, those which 
apply to mining are:
Mixed Companies: registered companies with a minority
foreign partner and a majority state company as sharehold­
ers. Majority foreign equity can be negotiated but the law 
does not specify how equity is paid for.
Joint Companies: as above but where the Angolan partner 
is not a state company.
Joint Ventures: contracts between foreign and national
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enterprises which do not require the formation of a regis­
tered company.
The 1988 law also sets out in .general terms the rights 
and obligations of foreign companies in Angola (articles 14, 
15, and 18).
Repatriation of profits
Fair compensation for expropriation and an arbitra­
tion mechanism
Concessional exemption from taxation for specified 
periods on a case by case basis
Exemption from import and export duties on a case by 
case basis
Right of operational autonomy subject to state monit­
oring
Obligation to train Angolan nationals and transfer 
technology
While the 1988 legislation is short on specifics and 
leaves a lot to be decided by bilateral negotiation, it rep­
resents a radical turnaround in state philosophy. Though the 
legislation is not specifically directed at the mineral 
sector it suggests that just about any of the forms of 
mineral agreements in force in market economy countries are 
now permissible in Angola. The provisions in the legislation 
resemble those present in the mineral laws of other African
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states such as Ghana which have had some success in recent 
years in attracting mineral investment (Commonwealth Secre­
tariat 19S9 ) .
5.2 Constraints on Diamond Agreements
While all possible contractual arrangements may be 
theoretically possible under the 1988 law, there are certain 
structural considerations that limit the form that major 
investments in an Angolan, hard-rock diamond mine can be 
expected to take.
Angola is a member of the Southern African Development 
and Coordination Council (SADCC). The SADCC encompasses a 
fair number of major diamond producers (Tanzania, Botswana, 
Zaire) and there is probably sufficient technical expertise 
within these states to make the operation of a major mine by 
the state a realistic option. However, the problem of capi­
tal still remains.
Angola is signatory to the third Lome Convention which 
governs the granting of aid from the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and lesser developed countries. The conven­
tion made specific allowance for grants and cheap loans to 
promote mining projects (Gruss 1986). These funds are ear­
marked for reconstruction projects, projects which have 
industrial development linkages, and which serve the long­
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term strategic interests of the EEC. Unfortunately a diamond 
mine does not seem to fit. into any of these categories.
In theory, funds for mine development might be avail­
able from one of the development banks, such as the World 
Bank, which have financed mining ventures in the past. As 
with the case of the Lome Convention, development funds for 
mining are usually justified if other economic linkages are 
generated as a result. Diamond mining produces few, if any, 
economic linkages. In all probability, Angola would be 
percieved to be able to make better use of development 
capital in projects with more immediate social benefit such 
as agriculture. Diamond mines would come a long way down the 
list of development priorities. The best that could be rea­
sonably expected would be for, say, minority development 
bank participation (as in the case of IFC participation in 
the Aredor Project in Guinea) to reduce private investors 
perception of risk.
Given a lack of substantial development bank funding 
the participation of private capital appears mandatory. The 
role of development funds is probably limited to risk insur­
ance, and financing infrastructure which has a social bene­
fit as well as benefiting a mine.
The need for substantial capital (as well as efficient 
use of this capital) effectively rules out ventures such as
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the present management contracts. Such arrangements are not 
suited to large-scale investments unless the contractor 
makes a substantial capital investment. The reason for this 
lies in the incentive to cost inflation in cost plus con­
tracts and consequent inefficient use of capital (Walde 
1989 ) .
Past diamond mining operations in Angola have developed 
an infrastructure and a labor force which could make a 
significant contribution towards the cost of a new mine 
compared to a greenfield investment. The Camutue prospect 
for instance, stands to benefit significantly from the 
availability of hydroelectric power and certain local allu­
vial plant facilities. This infrastructure can be regarded 
as a shadow contribution by the government to project capi­
tal. This in turn suggests that the logical format for a 
project would be the Joint Company option contained in the 
1988 law. Free government equity in a project can thus be 
justified on grounds of supply of infrastructure.
Despite the fairly liberal provisions of the 1988 Law 
on Foreign Investment there has not been any significant on­
shore investment of any kind in Angola to date. While one 
reason is undoubtablv the security situation, the current 
exchange rate mechanism is also a strong discentive to 
investment (Brown, 1990). The Angolan kwanza is officially
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valued at about thirty to the dollar and is grossly overval­
ued compared to the parallel (or black market) exchange 
rate. In theory at least, foreign investors face the pros­
pect of having to convert foreign currency at the official 
exchange rate in order to meet domestic expenses. This makes 
local labor very expensive as can be seen by referring to 
Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 shows the level of dollar denominated mining 
wages in various African countries for 197 5 and 1988 rela­
tive to wages in the United States. When nominal wages are 
adjusted for labor productivity we obtain labor costs per 
unit of output, the proper basis for comparison between 
countries.
Some of the figures in table 5,1 should be viewed with 
caution. For example, the productivity of Angolan labor is 
high compared to surrounding countries and may reflect use 
of oil industry statistics as a proxy for the mining indus­
try. Also implicit in the figures is the assumption that 
absolute and relative productivity has remained unchanged 
over the period 1975 to 1988. This is an unlikely state of 
affairs. Table 5.1 shows that, compared to the prevailing 
rates in adjacent countries, Angolan labor was expensive in 
1975 and was apparently even more expensive in 1988. Unfor­
tunately for Angolan workers this does not reflect, increased
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Table 5.1 Comparative Mining Labor Costs
USA Zambia S.Africa Botswana A n g o I a
1 . Relative 
19 75 Wages 1 0.29 0 . 1 5 0.18 0 . 3 0
\> Re l'ative 
Product i v i ty 1 0 . 68 0.44 0.49 0 . 7 1
3 . 19 7 5 $ Mine 
Wage Index 100 . 0 100.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0
4 . 1988 $ Mine 
Wage Index 214.9 89 . 4 196 . 3 201 . 4 346.2
5 . 1975 Mine ' 
Labor Cost. 100 . 0 42 . 6 3 4.1 36.7 4 2 . 3
6 . 19 88 Mine 
Labor Cost 214.9 38 . 1 66 . 9 73.9 146.3
Above as % 
of U.S. Cost 100 . 0 17.7 31.1 34.4 68 . 1
Note: Item 5 - (Item 1/Item 2 Ixltem 3 
Item 6 = (Item 1/Item 2)xltem 4
Source: Bureau of Mines International Mining Cost Indices.
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prosperity but is merely a product of local currency wage 
increases and a fixed exchange rate. While this is patently 
an artificial state of affairs it is the theoretical labor 
cost that an investor faces.
In the diamond-related service contracts agreed to 
date, this problem has been overcome by assigning local 
costs to the Angolan enterprise (Endiama) as part of its 
contribution to the project with the foreign partner being 
recompensed with part, of the foreign exchange earnings of 
the project. In principle this system could be extended to 
larger joint equity projects such as a hard-rock diamond 
mine, but it would still require that an equitable exchange 
rate for accounting purposes be established in order to 
properly determine the relative contributions of the part­
ners. The Angolan partner would have to be prepared to meet 
the costs denominated in local currency, while the foreign 
partner would meet the offshore, largely capital costs.
There has been some recent speculation (Diamond Inter­
national 1990) that the mineral law may be restructured 
along the lines of the petroleum law. There is some evidence 
to support this supposition in the 1988 JLawr on Foreign In­
vestment which provides for production-sharing (Article 14, 
Clause 4). In Angola, oil j^roduction-sharing agreements 
typically allow costs to be recovered from 50% of production
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with the remainder split between the state and the investor. 
The investor is taxed on his share and also usually supplies 
the capital (Barrows 1983). While such a scheme could be 
extended to hard minerals, and therefore be administered 
within the present tax collection system, it might be 
difficult to administer. With diamonds, there would be the 
additional problem of equitable stone valuation particularly 
in the case of large and valuable stones. There is also a 
significant difference between the cost recovery schedule 
for oil and hard minerals under the above production-sharing 
format. Revenue from an oil well is concentrated towards the 
beginning of production. The investor, who recovers costs 
from a percentage of production, in effect enjoys an accel­
erated depreciation schedule. In contrast cost recovery for a 
hard mineral project (with fairly constant output) is effec­
tively straight line depreciation. Finally there is the 
question of the value of the government’s contribution in 
terms of infrastructure. In brief, as a revenue-raising 
mechanism and as an incentive to investors, production- 
sharing applied to diamond mining appears to have no appar­
ent advantages and several potential pitfalls compared to 
more conventional agreement structures. Possible mechanisms 
are discussed in the following section.
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5.3 Alternative Mechanisms of Mineral Taxation
The objective of mining is to convert minerals into 
wealth, wealth which accrues to the different stakeholders 
in differing proportions dependent on the structure of the 
agreement between them. The purpose of this section is to 
briefly review the motives behind mineral contracts and how 
they are percieved by the various stakeholders. Contemporary 
mining legislation in diamond producing countries will be 
discussed and a suitable framework for the Angolan industry 
proposed,
In Angola, as in most, developing countries, ownership 
of mineral resources is vested in the state. Mining is seen 
as a means of improving the lot of country’s inhabitants 
through generation of foreign exchange, and through second­
ary industrial and welfare linkages. In developing resourc­
es the state is faced with two options: it can exploit the
minerals itself through the mechanism of a State Mineral 
Enterprise (SME) or it can contract the work to a third 
party. The third party is usually a transnational mining 
company (TNG). At first glance the former option appears the 
best since it promises to capture all of the rent generated 
by the project. In practice the second option is usually 
adopted. There are various reasons for this.
1. Mineral projects are inherently risky and bear a signifi-
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cant risk of overall financial failure. The involvement 
of a capital providing third party effectively insulates 
the state from this source of risk.
2. Developing countries are usually short of capital and 
what they do have is earmarked for welfare and infra 
structure projects. Mining comes a long way down the 
list.
3. A TNC will often possess specialized technological,
financial, and marketing skills not available to the host
country,
4. A TNC's survival depends on the successful outcome of the
project. This is a greater spur to efficiency than the
social or prestige-based motives driving a SME.
For the above reasons foreign companies are usually in­
volved to some degree in the mineral industries of develop­
ing countries. In the case of diamond development in Angola 
the participation of private capital becomes almost mandato­
ry given the probable lack of cheap development finance for 
a mine producing a ''luxury" product with no real economic 
linkages.
A government wants two things from a mineral contract. 
It wishes to maximize its revenue from a project, and for 
political reasons it wants to maintain its sovereignty over 
the deposit. These two objectives can work against each
T-3 9 4 5
other if .government control requirements act as a discentive 
to investment in the first place. Sovereignty issues are 
particularly sensitive in Africa where the colonial past is 
by no means dead and buried.
A company wants a contract that enables it to maximize 
its profit, that minimizes its exposure to risk, and that 
(since it is usually providing the capital) gives it a high 
degree of autonomy in the management of the project in ques­
tion. From the company's viewpoint "profit” can cover con­
siderations other than the direct economics of a specific 
project. In the simplest case, profit is the cash earned in 
excess of costs by the venture. With some commodities (and 
with diamonds in particular) the profit maximization motive 
may arise from the perpetuation of a noncompetitive market, 
structure which enables the firm to earn abnormal returns. 
The economics of a given mineral project may be relatively 
unimportant in the calculations of the TNC.
It should be clear by now that the motivation of the 
two parties contain considerable scope for conflict and this 
potential for instability is further enhanced by the unsta­
ble nature of mineral markets. Market instability alters the 
relative income of project stakeholders and can thus in­
crease risk through the possibility of ex post renegotiation 
of terms.
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Good mineral legislation will be so structured that 
(a) the objectives of various stakeholders can be achieved 
and (b) it adapts to changing market conditions in a manner 
which preserves stakeholders perceptions of equitable dis­
tribution of benefits.
Garnaut and Clunies Ross (1983) have proposed nine 
criteria for judging the quality of mineral legislation:
1. It should be neutral and not effect investment or produc­
tion decisions.
2. It should remain stable under the changing conditions 
that characterize the mineral industries.
3. It should minimize the investor’s perception of risk.
4. It should collect the maximum amount of economic rent 
poss ible.
5. It should be responsive to varying levels of profitabili­
ty •
6 . It should minimize fluctuations in state revenues.
7. It should not unduly delay revenue inflows to the state.
8 . It should be simple to impose.
9. It should be easy to administer.
Some of the above criteria are mutually incompatible 
and no single fiscal regime can achieve full compliance with 
the above criteria. For example, tax rates varying with 
profitability necessarily imply fluctuations in government
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revenues. In practice perfection, as defined above, can be 
approached but never entirely achieved.
Governments that play host to mining operations by TNCs 
can choose from a variety of mechanisms to obtain revenue 
from the projects. Considerations of sovereignty aside, the 
prime objective is- to maximize revenue without adversely 
affecting the TNC5 s decision to invest. The principal mecha­







The incidence of these instruments and how they are 
perceived is discussed below.
5.3.1 Flat Fees
Flat fees take the form of fixed annual payments (as in 
a Mining License) and/or as an up-front fee (as in the bid­
ding for offshore oil licenses). Given conditions of cer­
tainty about the resource’s value, known sovereign risk, and 
competition, bidders would be prepared to offer the net 
present value of the project as a flat fee. In theory, the
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income from such a system would recover the total available 
economic rent.
From the state’s point of view, flat fees are desirable 
as they represent a stable and early realization of income 
from a project, although the conditions of uncertainty that 
apply in practice invariably mean that flat fees represent 
only a portion of economic rent. The negative aspects of 
flat fees depend upon at what stage of a venture they are 
paid. If they are paid at the exploration stage they may 
convey {implicitly or explicitly) the right to mine. This 
weakens competition and implies that the investor can ex­
tract higher returns from the government than in the absence 
of fixed fees.
To an investor, flat fees represent an irrecoverable 
outlay, increase the project risk, and hence the required 
return. At the exploration stage, flat fees may be a 
discentive to investment, but if the fees concern a deposit 
of known worth (as is approximately true in the Angolan 
situation) then fixed fees are acceptable and can be re­
couped by negotiated concessions elsewhere in the fiscal 
package.
Small, annual fees usually labelled "Mining License" 
are common in the mining industry, but as far as the writer 
is aware, up-front payments are rare. In the Angolan context
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where certain deposits are well enough known to ensure prof­
itability (e.g., the Cuango alluvials) up-front fees would 
be a feasible option but not across the entire range of 
prospects.
The prime drawback to fixed fees in hard-rock mining is 
that the industry is characterized by considerable uncer­
tainty, particularly at the exploration stage, and so it is 
practically impossible to determine net present value of a 
project for the purpose of bidding a flat fee. Hard-rock 
diamond deposits are as subject to uncertainty as any metal 
mine. Although diamond grade may be less irregularly dis­
tributed than in some metal deposits this is offset by the 
relative complexity of diamond price determination compared 
to metals.
In the narrow case of the two deposits considered in 
this study (where past production data is available and 
where risk is therefore relatively low) one could argue for 
flat fees as part of the fiscal package. However, if one 
designs a general scheme of legislation around one or two 
special cases there is the risk that future exploration 
(yielding potentially far greater benefits) may be deterred. 




Royalties are charges on mineral production levied as 
a fixed sum per unit of output or as a percentage of sales 
value, irrespective of project profitability. The charge is 
usually set. out in legislation but is occasionally subject 
to bidding, as in recent gold projects in Tanzania (Daniel 
1989). Royalties are effectively an operating cost and will 
thus deter investment in marginal deposits and encourage 
high grading on established operations. On this basis they 
fail the Garnaut test of neutrality.
From the state’s point of view, royalties have the 
merit, of ensuring a early flow of revenue from a project 
particularly as mines tend to exploit the high grade first. 
Secondly, ad valorem royalties reflect fluctuation in miner­
al prices and therefore go some way to satisfying the reve­
nue maximization criterion. These factors, plus ease of 
imposition and administration, have ensured that royalties 
are a near universal feature of mineral legislation.
Investors view royalties as an added source of project 
risk since they are imposed whether the mine is making prof­
its or not. The response is to seek a higher return on in­
vestment than tvould be required in the absence of royalties. 
In practice this consideration may have little effect at the 
investment decision stage since the level of royalty is
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typically in the range 3% to 5%. For a project to be ap­
proved in a developing country it would have to promise a 
return well above the level of the royalty. The possibility 
of operating profit being insufficient to service the royal­
ty is remote. Consequently, investors tend to view royalties 
as a minimum tax and take this into account when negotiating 
other fiscal terms.In the case of diamonds, royalties may 
have a greater influence on decision making than with other 
minerals as the royalty tends to be significantly more. This 
tendency is apparent in the data set out below (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1989) . Ghana bucks the trend but in this case 





Lesotho 15% N/ A
Malawi 10% 5-7%
Tanzania 15% 1.5-5%
The only explanation that the writer has for higher 
royalties on diamonds is that they are percieved to be in­
trinsically more profitable than other commodities. There 
are indeed very profitable diamond mines but, like any other
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commodity, these are onl y  end members of a continuum and 
there are marginal deposits at any royalty or tax rate.
It seems likely that the prevailing royalty levels for dia­
monds (if applied to new projects) may well have the power 
to dissuade investment if the project is marginal, This 
would seem to be the case with Gamutue (where operating 
costs are close to the value of the ore) in Angola. On the 
other hand Catoca initially appears to be a more profitable 
proposition. Without wishing to anticipate the results of 
financial modeling one can anticipate that if Angola is to 
adopt royalties they should be low, responsive to profit­
ability, or both.
5.3.3 Income Taxes
A wide variety of revenue raising instruments can be 
included under the heading of income taxes. They all tax 
profit (i.e., revenue less allowable expenses) but the means 
of imposition vary. Commonly (e.g., in Botswana) the tax 
rate applied is the standard corporate tax rate, but this is 
invariably applied in conjunction with other instruments 
such as royalties and government equity.
The principal drawbacks to a simple proportional income 
tax is that it does not adjust to variations in project 
profitability and that a rate which is appropriate to an
Effiraua LAKES LIlRAfiY 
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average industrial company may be inappropriate to a venture 
whose profitability is partly a function of natural endow­
ments. From the point of view of the state this means that 
economic rent can escape the tax net. An overly generous tax 
scheme may not necessarily encourage investors who may per­
ceive it leading to increased sovereign risk when the state 
is tempted to unilaterally impose more equitable terms.
If standard corporate tax rates are an inappropriate 
mechanism; one solution is to impose a higher rate income 
tax (HRIT) on a pro.ject-by-pro.ject basis , the rate being 
established by negotiation. This can use the existing tax 
administration structure but still fails to adjust to vola­
tile revenues. It is also next to impossible to establish a 
fair rate at early stages in the investment process.
In recognition of the shortcomings of single-tier tax 
systems recent mineral legislation has tended to employ tax 
instruments which adapt, in a predetermined manner to varying 
profitability. Such systems are the progressive profits tax 
(PPT) and the resource rent tax (RRT). The PPT possesses two 
or more tax rate thresholds which are triggered when a pro­
ject earns returns in excess of certain profitability ra­
tios. For example, in Ghana, where a PPT is imposed, the 
profitability ratio is defined as the ratio between taxable 
income and depreciated capital investment (Commonwealth
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Secretariat 1989).
The RRT taxes any positive net present value the pro­
ject may generate when cash flows are discounted at the 
required rate of return for the capital employed. Such a tax 
will often function as a second tier tax beyond, say, stan­
dard corporate income tax, the effect of which is built into 
the NPY determination. The.RRT will-be triggered when NPV is 
pos itive.
Taxes such as PPT and RRT have the merit that they 
capture a high proportion of the economic rent of highly 
profitable investments but do not discourage investment in 
marginal deposits. A further positive aspect often mentioned 
is that the PPT and RRT are manifestly equitable from the 
state’s point of view. This should, lower the investor’s 
perception of sovereign risk. With reduced risk, investors 
should be willing to accept lower rates of return on any 
given project which in turn increases the total economic 
rent.
While PPT and RRT are efficient in many respects {they 
satisfy the first five of the Garnaut & Clunies-Ross crite­
ria) they do have deficiencies. They are not simple to ad­
minister, particularly in the case of the RRT, as profit­
ability is as much a function of accounting practice as 
anything else. Revenue streams from such taxes are volatile
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and can be pushed well into the future by the need to recov­
er capital. Walde (1989) also points out that they are often 
percieved as profit caps that can deter investment in an 
industry where "bonanza psychology" is prevalent. In fact 
(unless the tax rate is 100% ) they only capture part, of the
economic rent. A final consideration is that if supernormal 
profits are taxed away in the early years of a project to be 
followed by weak prices and low profits, then the final rate 
of return to the investor can fail below his required rate 
of return.
The price of diamonds are determined in a market that 
approximates a monopoly and which places a premium on market 
stability. Revenue volatility is thus less likely to be as 
important a justification of variable tax rates than it is 
the case of, say, a metal mine. On the other hand the his­
torical track record of gem diamonds at least is one of 
increasing prices in real terms. This implies increasing 
profitabi1ity with time, making the determination of an 
equitable and stable fixed tax rate very difficult. On this 
basis there would seem to be a strong case for something 




Equity participation in mineral projects is a popular 
means by which the state can both obtain revenue and gain 
influence over the conduct of operations. Equity is either 
acquired free during bilateral negotiations or is paid for 
on a pro rata basis. In the latter case the equity will 
often be paid for out of the state’s share of the dividend 
stream from the project. The initial capital is raised whol­
ly by the TNC partner who debits the state’s account accord­
ingly and the debited amount will normally accrue interest.
A variant on this theme, possibly applicable to the Angolan 
situation, is where the state contributes infrastructure and 
this is assigned some equity value.
Economically, free equity has exactly the same effect 
as a rate of corporate income tax equal to the state’s equi­
ty share and thus has the effect of discouraging private 
investment. The economic effect of equity that is paid for 
over time is relatively neutral with respect to its impact 
on the investment decision but depends on the tax status of 
the state’s payments. If they are not counted as part of the 
TNC ’ s income and are tax free, then the effect is akin to a 
tax holiday, early cash flows are increased, and investment 
is encouraged. This is a useful situation if creditors in­
sist on a short payback period. If the state’s payments
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count as taxable income then the effect on investor revenue 
is as if the TNC has 100% of the equity during the period of 
state payments and a fully participating joint venture part­
ner there after. In this case x^aid equity has a largely 
neutral impact on investment decisions and may be slightly 
positive in that it may reduce perceptions of risk.
Government motives for acquiring equity have been dis­
cussed at 1engtli by Sims (198 5) who identifies the following 
reasons:
Revenue maximization 
Training of residents 
Control over decision making 
Monitoring the TNC 
Oligopoly/monopoly control 
Sims argues convincingly that the first three of the above 
objectives can be equally well achieved through legislation 
as by the state having a seat on the board. The monitoring 
function does justify a board presence as TNCs may well be 
tempted to suborn the interests of the project to their 
international interests. Transfer pricing is a pervasive 
practice by which such externalization is accomplished. In 
rare cases the state may wish to establish control to main­
tain an oligopolistic or monopolistic market structure of 
which OPEC is the prime example. This bears consideration in
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the case under consideration as the diamond market is hardly 
a competitive one. Nevertheless, legislation specifying sale 
of minerals to a government agency can perform this function 
as well as equity can.
From the perspective of the TNC there are good and bad 
aspects of government equity. As mentioned above the main 
benefit of state equity is that it can serve to reduce per­
ceptions of sovereign risk and thus reduce the required rate 
of return (this in turn increases available economic rent 
for the state to tax). Negative aspects are potential loss 
of operational autonomy and the effect on the TNCs offshore 
tax liability. In many cases, where double taxation treaties 
exist, a c o m p a n y  can credit foreign taxes paid against lia­
bilities in its home country. Dividends to shareholders are 
not deductible. Given the choice a TNC m i g h t  therefore 
choose to pay tax rather than dilute its equity holdings.
5.3.5 Production-Sharing
Production-sharing is a means of taxation which is 
common in the oil industry and which is employed in Angola. 
There is a possibility that this may be applied to the min­
ing industry in Angola and provision is made in the 1988 Law 
on Foreign Investment for such an eventuality.
The revenue raising mechanisms incorporated into pro­
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duct ion-sharing agreements can have the economic effect of 
an ad valorem royalty or of a higher rate income tax depend­
ing on how they are structured. There are two basic vari­
ants, but in both the TNC bears all the exploration risk and 
all the capital cost of development. In one variant (type 1) 
the state then takes a proportion of the production. The TNC 
recoups its costs from the balance and is taxed on remaining 
net income. This case is equivalent to a royalty plus corpo­
rate income1 tax. In the second variant (type 2) the company 
first recoups its costs (subject to limits on capital recov­
ery) from production and then the balance is split between 
the state and the TNC. The TNC is taxed on its share. This 
method is equivalent to imposing a higher rate of income tax 
and is the method employed in Angola.
The disadvantages of applying production-sharing to 
hard minerals was set out at the end of section 5.1. Brief­
ly, production-sharing in oil agreements amounts to acceler­
ated depreciation. In hard mineral production, with rela­
tively constant production, it amounts to straight line 




Previous chapters have established likely costs, reve­
nues, .and fiscal regimes for Angolan diamond prospects. Tn 
this chapter the above data is incorporated into a discount­
ed cash flow spreadsheet to determine project viability 
under a variety of economic and fiscal scenarios.
6 . 1 Discount Rate
Mining projects in developing countries are usually 
financed by more than one means. The principal instruments 
employed are (a) equity finance by mining companies, (b) 
loans to companies by commercial banks and development agen­
cies, (c) loans to governments by commercial banks and de­
velopment agencies, and (d) export credits on imported capi­
tal equipment. In this study an attempt will be made to 
estimate the cost of funds derived from the first three 
sources for use as discount rates in the financial modeling 
process.
6.1.1 Cost of Equity
In the sense employed here, cost of equity is taken to 
mean the rate of return required by investors in a mining
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firm. There are various ways of calculating the cost of 
equity, but the method used here has been to employ the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
The expression for the CAPM is
K f r  K rf +  ( K a "  K rf > ’ B
where: K* = Cost of Equity for the firm
K’r-= the cost of risk free borrowing (treasury 
bills)
K = rate of return on the market (e.g. CapitalIB appreciation and dividends on, say, the S&P 
500 Index)
(3 = Covariance of the firms share price and the 
market index.
The "beta" value (13) for a firm is a measure of the 
risk associated with investing in the firm compared to in­
vesting in the market (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange) as 
a whole. Beta measures share price volatility relative to 
the market. This is a function of the industry and degree of 
debt leverage of the firm.
In the diamond industry, there are several publicly 
quoted companies but De Beers Consolidated Mines (DBCM) is 
the only one for which information is easily available.
Since DBCM is also a prime candidate for investment in the 
Angolan industry, it was used to estimate the required rate 
of return for investors in diamond mining companies.
The "beta" for De Beers’s American Depository Receipts 
is 0.85 (source: Value Line, May 1990) . For the year ended
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June 1990 the average return on United States Treasury bills 
was 8.02% and the return on the Standard & Poors 500 Index 
was 16.6%. On this basis the CAPM predicts a cost of equity 
of 15.3% for De Beers, For the year ending June 1989 the T- 
bill rate was 8.13% and the return on the S&P 500 was 17% 
giving' an estimated cost of equity of 15.7%. The average of 
the two estimates, 15.5%, has been used in this study. From 
the author Us personal knowledge of the industry this figure 
is very close to the traditional rule-of-thumb figure used 
by De Beers in capital budgeting.
6.1.2 Cost of Debt
The main lenders to the mining industry are commercial 
banks and development organizations; the main borrowers are 
either private mining companies or state mining enterprises 
(SMEs) giving four possible lender-borrower combinations.
The most, expensive combination occurs when commercial banks 
lend to private companies; the cheapest is when development 
organizations lend to SMEs (i.e., sovereign governments). 
Beyond such institutional costs of debt are additional costs 
associated with commercial and political risks, and both act 
as a premium over and above the basic cost of debt. Current 
practice is to take the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) 
as the base rate. The International Finance Corporation
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(which is mid-range in cost of debt between, say, the World 
Bank and commercial banks) offered the following educated 
guesses for the premiums mining loans might attract in dif­
ferent circumstances (telephone interview with S. McCleod, 
IFC, 19/07/90 ) .
Development loans to credit worthy countries, LIBOR 
plus 0.75%
Commercial loans to credit worthy countries, LIBOR plus 
3%
Development loans to high risk countries, LIBOR plus 2%
Commercial loans to high risk countries, LIBOR plus 6%
In the case of Angola it. might be best to use the rates 
applicable to a country that may represent Angola a few 
years down the road, Ghana for instance. Ghana is a newly 
stable country with an attractive minerals policy and where 
loans for gold mines have recently been made. In the case 
of Ghana the IFC suggests that risk premia of 1% for loans 
to SMEs and 2.5% to companies would be appropriate. For 
Ghana (and, by implication, Angola), these figures added to 
the 1989 LIBOR rate of 9.16%, give 10.16% and 11.66% as the 
cost of debt to the state and companies respectively.
6 .2 Financial Model Structure
The financial template used to evaluate the Angolan
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prospects under various fiscal regimes follows the logic set 
out below. It fo11owts a conventional capital budgeting for­
mat (Stermole, 1987) except that provision is made for de­
ductions that equate to free government equity and a re­
source rent tax. The logic is as follows (for details of 



















deduct: resource rent tax
NET CASH FLOW
The above framework was used to evaluate the Camutue 
and Cat oca prospects. As a first step each property was 
evaluated as if it. were a wholly state-owned and operated
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enterprise. This determines the total profit (as measured by 
NPV) available if the project were funded by a development 
loan, the cheapest source of funds. Projects that are not 
viable under this scenario will not be viable under any 
other form of financing.
6 .3 Base Case Model Performance
The assumptions underlying the base case evaluation of 
the two financial models are as follows:
--General price and cost escalation of 4% per year in 
dollar terms.
— Capital cost as per USBM cost model prediction plus 
20% contingency, escalated and with interest 
capitalized. Replacement capital at 5% of original in­
vestment after five years operation.
— 100% debt finance at 10.16% repayable over four years. 
--Tax-free state run operation.
6.3.1 Camutue
In addition to the above model specifications the 
Camutue model also contains the following input:
--Ore grade of 0.12 carats/ton and a diamond value of 
$214 per carat increasing at 1.5% a year in real 
terms.
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— One million ton-per-year mining rate and a ten year
mine life.
The model yields marginal results when the project is 
wholly funded by state borrowing at 10.16%. The NPV at 
10.16% is $0.5 million.
The sensitivity of the project, to critical variables is 
demonstrated in fig. 6.1. xdiich shows that Camutue is ex­
tremely sensitive to changes in grade (changes in diamond 
prices have an identical effect), is not particularly sensi­
tive to changes in capital or operating costs, and quite 
insensitive to interest rates.
As Angola is a member of the Lome Convention and as 
Camutue might, at a pinch, be considered an old mine in need 
of new capital, then Camutue might qualify for development 
finance. Short of an outright grant (which is unlikely for 
the reasons elaborated in chapter 5) the most likely form of 
aid would be in the form of an interest rate subsidy. Under 
Lome III this amounts to 3% (Gruss 1986) and would reduce 
the cost of debt to 7.16%. When the Camutue model is evalu­
ated, assuming it is financed wholly by debt at the above 
subsidized interest rate, the NPV (at. 7.16%) is $15.3 mil­
lion .
Under the conditions of the base case evaluation it 
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Figure 6.1 Camutue Base Case: Sensitivity Analysis
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based on exploration data. There is room for doubt as to the 
real value of Camutue diamonds. They were escalated by an 
index based on ''average gems'' and Camutue diamonds are bet­
ter than average. Current information is insufficient to 
test the truth of the matter.
In summary, Camutue is too small to support a large 
mining operation and enjoy significant economies of scale.
It is therefore an intrinsically high cost operation. Grades 
are too low to cover this high cost and provide a reasonable 
return on the investment at commercial interest rates.
Under the best case of concessionary development bank
zed development project. However, whether 
ly proceed under these conditions is open to 
was previously stated that a major reason for 
pipe such as Camutue would be to generate funds 
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ivate investors. Significantly improved grade is 
the grade used in the model is that from past
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finance and (tax free) state operation returns are marginal­
ly attractive but. the net return on the project is low in 
absolute terms. Of the major parameters that affect project 
economics only the current, value of the diamonds leaves 
sufficient room for doubt, and has the economic leverage to 
transform this gloomy picture.
6.3.2 Catoca
All of the basic model parameters set out above apply 
to Catoca plus these additional ones:
— A grade of 0.6 carats/ton and an initial diamond value 
of $26/carat increasing as shown in table 4.1.
— A mining rate of 7 million tons per year and an eval­
uated mine life of twenty years.
--In addition to normal price escalation, operating costs 
were escalated at 2% a year in real terms to capture 
the effect of a deepening open pit mine throughout the 
evaluation period. A depth of 120 meters by the twen­
tieth year of operation is envisaged.
The base case evaluation of Catoca indicates that there 
is a reasonable probability of satisfactory economics. Under 
the base case conditions, Catoca has an NPV at 10.16% of 
$288 million. The sensitivity of the escalated rate of re­
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As was observed with Camutue the principal down-side 
risk wTith Catoca is associated with diamond values and/or 
grades that are substantially less than those used in the 
base case. The project economics are quite insensitive to 
changes in the other variables (other than low capital cost 
which is most unlikely). The conclusion that can be drawn 
from this preliminary look at the project economics is that 
Catoca represents a potential mine at least from the view­
point of a state-run operation.
In the following sections the impact of various project, 
structures and fiscal regimes on Catoca will be examined,
6 .4 Impact of Alternative Fiscal Regimes
Given the variety of revenue raising instruments avail­
able to governments, the various possible depreciation 
schedules, and the numerical values that can be assigned to 
both, there is literally an infinite number of fiscal permu­
tations that could be applied to the Catoca prospect. In 
this study it was decided to observe the impact of different 
tax systems by applying those that apply in other African 
countries that have a diamond mining industry. As it hap­
pens, there is considerable variation in the systems that 
are applied. The countries modeled are Botswana, Tanzania, 
and Ghana. In addition the production-sharing agreement
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structure used in the Angolan oil industry was modeled as 
there has been speculation that it might be applied to the 
hard minerals sector. The basic elements of these four fis­
cal systems are as follows:
Botswana
Ad valorem royalty of 10%.
Corporate income tax at 3 5%
Non-resident income tax of 15% on balance of 
above
Straight line depreciation over the life of the mine 
Minimum free state equity of 15%
Tanzania
Ad valorem royalty of 15%
Corporate income tax at 55%
Depreciation of 40% in year 1 followed by straight line 
depreciation of the balance over the next six years 
No mandatory minimum free equity to the state
Ghana
Ad valorem royalty of 3% to 12% related to- profitability 
Corporate income tax at 45%
Resource rent tax on excess returns at negotiable rates 
(75% of cash flow- beyond a DCF-ROR of 15.5% was applied) 
Minimum free state equity of 10%
Depreciation at 75% in year 1 followed by 50% per year on 
the reducing balance
Angola
Capital provided by investor
Cost recovery from 50% of gross revenue in any one 
year
Minimum government share of 40% of the balance 
Investor taxed at 50% on his share of the balance
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The above fiscal regimes were modeled in combination 
with two different financial project structures. In one case 
the project was financed 67% by equity and 33% by debt using 
the cost of funds to corporations that were derived above 
(15.5% and 11.66%, respectively). In the second case the 
project was funded 100% by equity, as is often the practice 
with De Beers.
The results of the financial simulations are expressed 
in terms of the DCF-ROR and millions of dollars of NPV to 
the investor. Income to the state is expressed in millions 
of dollars of gross retained value (GRV) and present re­
tained value (PV-RV) discounted at a nominal 8% which is 
taken to represent a social discount rate.
While the absolute revenue derived from a project is 
important from the viewpoint of the state, the timing of the* 
revenue is also a significant factor given the time value of 
money. The relative efficiency of the above tax systems in 
bringing revenue forward can be judged by dividing the pres­
ent value of revenue by the gross amount raised. This proce­
dure gives the figures set out in the second part of table 
6 . 1 .
Table 6.1 represents the best deal that is theoretical­
ly available to an investor taking published legislation at 
face value. In practice more onerous conditions might apply,
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Table 6.1 Comparative Returns for Catoca 
Under Different Fiscal Regimes
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33/67 0.316 0.290 0 . 281 0 .278
0/100 0.321 0.296 0 .286 0 . 285
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particularly with respect to free state equity. On the other 
hand a government faced with the prospect of losing an 
investment would probably make concessions in individual 
cases. While in reality the rules can be (and are) bent, 
they have to be taken at face value for purposes of compari­
son. Keeping in mind the above caveats, the following con­
clusions can be drawn from the four financial models:
1. The Angolan production-sharing model would fail to at­
tract private sector investment. The main reason for 
this is that the governments take is too large, and is 
in fact the largest of the four models. From the state’s 
perspective the timing of state income is also the 
worst of the four models. It is concentrated towards
the end of the project due to the projected real in 
crease in diamond prices. This stands in stark con­
trast to the case of an oil project (for which produc­
tion sharing was designed) where production is great 
est in year one and declines thereafter.
2. The Botswana system of taxation also fails to attract 
private investment. While it recovers revenue at a 
fairly early period the gross amount is less than for 
Tanzania and Angola. The reasons for this lie in the 
use of straight line depreciation. Straight line depre­
ciation decreases taxable income over a longer period,
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and reduces the return to the investor by allowing 
inflation to erode the value of capital recovery.
3. The Tanzanian system is much the same as the Botswana 
system in its structure and performance. In Chapter 5 
it was argued that high ad valorem royalties (which 
are, effectively, additional production costs) act as a 
strong discentive to investment in marginal deposits.
The truth of this can be seen in the case of Tanzania 
where a 15% royalty is imposed on diamonds.
4. The fiscal regime employed in Ghana yields significantly 
greater returns to investors than the other regimes and 
would almost be successful in attracting private invest­
ment under the base case assumptions and one can easily 
visualise that slightly greater debt leverage would tip 
the scale. This relatively successful outcome is 
achieved at the price of some sacrifice in government 
revenues although the amount raised is not significantly 
less than in the case of Botswana. The income concen­
trates towards the end of the project rather than at the 
beginning due to the increased incidence of the variable 
royalty and the resource rent tax once an economic rate 
of return has been made.
5. Debt leverage increases returns to the investor under all 
fiscal regimes. The effect on critical project variables
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under Ghanaian taxation is shown in fig. 6.3.
Fig. 6.3 shows that Catoca would be attractive to a pri­
vate investor when financed by at least 50% debt. The 
investor would have to be able to borrow at the given 
rate (11.16%) and be able to persuade a bank to lend a 
relatively high proportion of the total capital (33% is 
the usual limit ) . These two conditions strongly favor the 
larger company. Small mining companies would be at a 
relative disadvantage because: (a) banks would add a
greater risk premium to the interest rate, (b) banks 
would be unwilling to loan such a high proportion of the 
total capital to a high risk company, and (c) a small 
company will probably be faced with a higher hurdle rate
than a large one. The net result of these factors com­
bined with the relatively marginal economics of Catoca 
suggests that, the Angolans may be stuck with De Beers 
whether they like it or not.
6 .5 Effect of Fixed Exchange Rates
The reader will remember that the preceding DCF-ROR 
estimates used mixed indices based on South African capi­
tal costs and Botswana operating costs. These are thought 
to represent more realistic costs than those published by 
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exchange rate. It was argued in chapter 2 that the artifi­
cially high exchange rate of the Angolan kwanza has a deter­
rent effect
on investment in Angola as it makes domestic prices appear 
very expensive in dollar terms. The magnitude of this effect 
can be seen from the following example.
Capital and operating costs for Catoca were calculated 
using the cost model derived in chapter 3 and cost indices 
for Angola supplied by the USBM. The results were compared 
with the costs derived using mixed indices. The mixed indi­
ces, it will be remembered, consist of South African capital 
costs and operating costs for Botswana which are based on 
convertible currencies. The transportation factors built 
into cost model, to account for long supply lines were dis­
carded when using the Angolan indices (which should have 
transport costs built in).
Cost estimates based on Angolan indices are approxi­
mately 60% greater than those based on the mixed indices 
(which simulate an environment that would encourage invest­
ment) . The basic costs, exclusive of escalation and interest 
capitalization are set out below.
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Mixed Index Angolan Index
Mill Capital ($million) 





Mill Operating ($/ton) 
Mine Operating ( " )




As one might expect the costs based on Angolan indices 
have a dramatic, and negative effect on project economics. 
Taking the Ghanian fiscal model and the 6 7% equity finance 
option as a basis for comparison, the following results are 
obtained. DCF-ROR to the investor drops to -10.1% from 
+14.4%. Gross retained value decreases from $1081 million to 
$350 million with the latter figure being composed entirely 
of royalties.
Too much significance should not be read into the above 
results. The main point is to demonstrate the distorting 
effect of overvalued exchange rates on project economics. 
Artificially high exchange rates can only have a negative 
impact on how investors perceive the investment climate. 
"Expensive” local costs may influence the all important 
first impression, even if in practice investors realize that 




The Angolan diamond industry is approaching an economic 
crossroads. Past exploitation has brought alluvial ore re­
serves to the point of economic exhaustion and diamond pro­
duction is making a decreasing contribution to the national 
economy at a time when growth is sorely needed. To reverse 
this trend will require the development of hard-rock diamond 
deposits and considerable capital investment. The issue 
facing the Angolans is how to get from here to there.
The viability of known, hard-rock diamond deposits in 
Angola depends on two interrelated factors. First, what are 
the five prospects actually worth to a mining company (be it 
privately or state owned)? Second, what kind of fiscal 
regime should govern mining activities? In essence, how' big 
is the cake and how should it be divided?
There are two technical options for kimberlite develop­
ment in Angola, one (modeled under the Camutue case) is to 
develop one of the smaller pipes and use the cash’ flow to 
develop larger and more expensive deposits. This approach 
is conceivably within the financial resources of the state, 
numerous potential investors and, possibly, international 
development organizations. The second option is to make a
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large capital investment 
Catoca). This leads to e 
tities of diamonds but r 
velopers. The economics 
dent on the final form o 
in Angola and on the int 
rate system. The present, 
makes Angola an expensiv 
rounding countries.
Recent changes in Angolan investment policy indicate a 
greater willingness to allow foreign, private sector invest­
ment in industries previously reserved exclusively to the 
state. The new policy allows for- the full range of contempo­
rary mineral agreements from service contract to foreign 
majority ownership and is designed to encourage foreign 
investment. Mineral investment can now proceed along more 
than one avenue. At one end of the spectrum the state could 
develop the deposits and take the risk itself. At the other 
extreme is foreign majority ownership where state revenues 
accrue through taxation and other fiscal instruments.
To determine the worth of Angola's known diamond re­
sources, a capital and operating cost model for a hard-rock 
diamond mine was developed (based on the USBM Cost Estimat­
ing System) using the Argyle Mine in Australia as a tech­
in a major deposit (represented by 
arly production of significant quan- 
educes the number of potential de- 
of both options are heavily depen- 
f currently evolving fiscal policy 
reduction of a flexible exchange 
system of fixed exchange rates 
e place to operate compared to sur-
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nical model. Although the USBM system is based on engineer­
ing data for the United States it can be applied to the 
evaluation of foreign mines by using the USBM International 
Mining Cost Indices. That such an approach is viable is 
demonstrated by the fact that the model underestimated the 
actual capital expenditure at Argyle by just under 20% and 
overestimated operating costs by 18%, acceptable accuracy 
for a preliminary estimate. To have reasonable assurance of 
similar accuracy in the case of Angola, due allowance was 
made for the effect of long transportation distances and the 
distorting effect of fixed exchange rates on project costs.
The cost model was used to estimate the costs of a 7 
million ton-per-year mine at Catoca in Angola and a 1 mil­
lion ton-per-vear operation at Camutue. These pipes have the 
highest value ore (in terms of dollars per ton) of known 
deposits and possess infrastructure advantages over other 
k imberli tes.
Cost modeling of Camutue and Catoca indicated capital 
costs in 198S money (excluding escalation, contingency, and 
capitalized interest) of $60.9 and $217.4 million respec­
tively, Operating costs were $16.68 and $5.34 respectively.
To determine the total returns available to various 
stakeholders from the deposits, a hypothetical project 
structure was simulated which assumed state ownership and
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100% debt finance at rates applicable to loans between the 
IFC and sovereign borrowers. The model provides a first 
estimate of state income under the most favorable of condi­
tions and provides a datum against which to compare income 
under alternative scenarios.
Diamond prices used in the financial simulation were 
based on past valuations updated using published diamond 
price indices.
The financial simulation indicated unsatisfactory rates 
of return for the Camutue deposit under all conditions other 
than when cheap, subsidized development funds are available. 
With state ownership, and finance by low-cost loans through 
the Lome Convention at around 7.16%, Camutue has an NPV of 
$15 million, a trivial income to the state for the required 
effort. The available rent, is also insufficient to finance 
any larger developments.
The potential returns from the development of Camutue 
are particularly sensitive to revenue which is, in turn, 
sensitive to the values used for diamond price, grade, and 
price escalation. The tabulation set out below shows the 
percentage increase in the above parameters that would be 
required to give an investor a satisfactory rate of return 





% Increase in Grade 
or Initial Price
% Rate of Increase 
in Real Price over 
Project Life______
100 63 7 . 4
67 52 6 . 4
For reasons set out in the text the required increases in 
grade and rate of increase in diamond price are considered 
unrealistic. An initial diamond price of between US$325 and 
US$3 50 per carat is barely conceivable given that the as­
sumed price was based on an "average gem" index and Camutue 
gems are considered superior. The question on diamond value 
can only be resolved by market evaluation of a significant 
sample of stones which implies the need for test mining.
The fundamental weaknesses of Camutue (and by impli­
cation, other small prospects) are short life, high oper­
ating costs, and low contained value. Small scale, hard-rock 
diamond mining in Angola is not likely to get the industry 
back on its feet.
The basic financial simulation on Catoca shows an NPV 
of $288 million. This might represent an attractive invest­
ment to the state or, possibly, to an outside investor. 
Evaluation of Catoca under various fiscal regimes yields the 
following four findings.
1. Under existing Angolan taxation (based on petroleum pro-
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duction-sharing agreements) Catoca does not yield an ade­
quate return to a private sector investor. The best 
return an investor could hope to make is 9.92% which is 
inadequate when compared to an estimated cost of equity 
for a large diamond company of 15.5%. Production-Sharing 
is better suited to hydrocarbon projects rather than hard 
minerals because cost recovery (i.e., depreciation) is 
related to the level of production. With maximum hydro­
carbon production at the beginning of a project the net 
effect is one of accelerated depreciation. Mineral pro­
jects have a relatively flat production curve and thus 
experience something like straight line depreciation 
under production-sharing.
If the project is evaluated using current legisla­
tion for Botswana, and Tanzania as a model (based on r o y ­
alties, income tax, and state equity) it also fails to 
achieve the investors required rate of return. The basic 
flaw in the Botswana and Tanzanian taxation systems is a 
heavy reliance on fixed-rate fiscal instruments. The 
Tanzanian and Botswana schemes levy high royalties on 
diamonds and thus effectively raise operating costs.
2. The literature on mineral taxation argues for flexible 
fiscal instruments (such as siiding-scale royalties) 
whose incidence varies with project profitability. Such
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instruments do not deter marginal investments hut still 
recover a high proportion of economic profits from the 
occasional bonanza. Ghana has .just such a system of taxa­
tion and when this is applied to the Catoca project (at 
100% equity finance), a return to the investor is 13.19%. 
Under conditions of 60% debt finance, the return to the 
in vestor i n o reases t o j us t o ve r 16% whi ch is s uf f ic i en t 
to promote investment. The present value of state revenue 
is $293.7 m i11ion ,
3. The marginal nature of Catoca, the scale of the invest­
ment and the degree of leverage needed to achieve a sat­
isfactory return on investment suggests that large com­
panies (i.e., De Beers) would be the likely channel of 
private investment. Smaller' companies would probably
experience problems raising the required caj>i tai , wou 1 d 
probably pay more for debt finance and would face a high­
er required rate of return than a large diversified firm.
4. Angola appears to have a natural endowment in hard-rock 
diamond deposits with the potential to encourage private 
investment. The best of the known deposits, Catoca, would 
just be attractive to a private investor given a fiscal 
scheme that uses flexible rate instruments (such as Gha­
na). However, this conclusion is based uioon the as sump-
ti on of a flexible exchang e rate po1iev that ijou1d bri ng
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capital and operating costs into line with those in adja­
cent countries. Under the present regime of fixed ex­
change rates an outside investor- is, in theory, faced 
with capital and operating costs some 60% greater than 
would apply under flexible exchange rates. Given the 
marginal economic characteristics of even the best of the 
known deposits (Catoca), fixed exchange rates represent 
an absolute barrier to investment.
In conclusion, Angola has the potential to become a 
middle rank diamond producer on the basis of known deposits. 
Whether it will ever be a major producer depends on the 
potential of the southeast sector of the country, and to 
quantify this potential will require a lot of exploration. 
The Ghanaian style of mineral taxation that is indicated for 
Cat oca is also that which provides the best incentive to 
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